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Modern Jurisprudence is emphatically a German cre-
ation. Kant, Hegel, Hugo, Savigny, Thibaut, Falck, and
their laborious and not unworthy successors have stamped
their Personality, their Nomenclature, their Ethical tone,
their Methods of philosophical analysis . . . ineffaceably
upon the Science of jurisprudence.'
When Sheldon Amos, in 1872, emphasized the importance of
German scholarship for late nineteenth century legal thought, he
expressed a view widely shared among his contemporaries. The
major reason for their interest in German learning was that the
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common lawyers of the "classical period" of Anglo-American juris-
prudence, roughly the two generations from the 1850s to World
War 1, 2
 were intensely preoccupied with the idea of law as a science.
This idea was neither exclusively nor originally German, 3 but in the
nineteenth century German scholars pursued it more consistently,
debated it more intensely, and refined it more highly than any other
contemporary legal culture. As a result, many leading jurists in
England and the United States considered German "Rechtswissen-
schaft" a reference point, and frequently a model. 4 Today most
Anglo-American scholars of comparative legal history acknowledge
this role of German legal thought, and have already explored in-
dividual aspects of it. 5
Despite this consensus about the importance of German ideas
for "classical" Anglo-American jurisprudence among nineteenth
2 What I call "the classical period" is roughly identical with Grant Gilmore's "Age of
Faith." See G. GILMORE, THE AGES or AMERICAN LAW 41-67 (1977). It is the period dominated
by what Karl Llewellyn called "the formal style," see K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 35-45 (1962), and what Thomas C. Grey called "classical legal science." See Grey,
Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REv. I (1983). While different scholars have different
ideas about the exact time frame of this period (compare Kennedy, Toward a Historical Under-
standing of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America 1850-1940, in 3
RESEARCH IN LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 3 (S. Spitzer ed. 1980) with Sugarman, Legal Theory, the
Common Law Mind and the Making of the Textbook Tradition, in LEGAL THEORY AND COMMON
LAW 26, 44 (W. Twining ed. 1986) (ca. 1850-1907)), the idea of legal science was most
popular from the 1850s to the dawn of realism. For the purposes of this article, World War
I is a convenient cut-off date because it marked a rapid decline in the influence of German
ideas on American legal thought. The concept of legal science dominated particularly the
jurisprudence of Langdell and his school at Harvard, from where it spread to American
legal academia in general. See J. REDL/CH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOLS, 16-17 (1914).
3 The idea of law as a science has been a major ingredient of the civil law tradition, at
least since the middle ages. See H.J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION 151-64 (1983). In the
common law orbit, it had a tradition even before the 19th century. See D. BooRsTIN, THE
MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF LAW (1941); Shapiro, Law and Science in 17th Century England, 21
STAN. L. REV. 727 (1969).
4 See, e.g., J. BRYCE, ON THE ACADEMIC STUDY OF THE CIVIL LAW 17 (1871); Beale, The
Development of During the Past Century, 18 HARV. L. REV. 271, 283 (1905); Smith,
Four German Jurists, 10 Pot- Set. Q. 664, 666 (1895).
5 See, e.g., Clark, Tracing the Roots of American Legal Education, 51 RASELS ZEITSCHRIFT
313 (1987); Hoeflich, Transatlantic Friendships & The German Influence on American Law in the
First Half of the Nineteenth Century, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 599 (1987); Reimann, The Historical
School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter, and the Defeat of the New York Civil Code, 37 AM. J.
COMP. L. 95 (1989) [hereinafter Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification]; Reimann,
Holmes' 'Common Law' and German Legal Science, in: Robert W. Gordon (ed.) (forthcoming)
[hereinafter Reimann, Holmes' `Common Law]; Riesenfeld, The Influence of German Legal Theory
on American Law: The Heritage of Savigny and His Disciples, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1989);
Schwartz, Einfli2sse cleave/ler Zivilistik im Auslande, in RECHTSGESCHICHTE UND GEGENWART 26
(Wieacker & Thieme eds. 1960).
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century as well as present-day legal scholars, there has been sur-
prisingly little understanding of what nineteenth century German
legal science really was. Quite to the contrary, references to it are
rife with ambiguities and contradictions.
Even the common law jurists of the "Age of Faith" 6
 themselves
had no clear and uniform conception of German legal science. Some
praised the "German exactness in detail," while others criticized
the German "tendency to excessive generalization." Thus, scholars
employed German jurisprudence to reinforce arguments that some-
times pointed in opposite directions. When Holmes criticized Lang-
dell, he referred to German legal science in order to demonstrate
the evils of formalism and abstract logic. On the other hand, Holmes
often relied on German scholarship to support his own conclusions.'
When James Coolidge Carter attacked Field's New York Civil Code,
he built on German arguments against codification. Field in turn
pointed out that the Germans were in fact in the process of large-
scale codification and cited German works in favor of his own
project. '€} Common lawyers sometimes held such divergent views of
the same German thinker that scholars as different as the historian
Maitland and the analytical jurist Markby could both consider them-
selves followers of Savigny." German legal science meant many
things to different people, and in fact sometimes, as in Holmes'
case, meant different things to the same person.
In present-day Anglo-American scholarship, the meaning of
German legal science is still not clear. Existing accounts of nine-
teenth century German jurisprudence are largely limited to sum-
mary descriptions of the most basic developments and of a few
fundamental ideas. 12
 Some scholars acknowledge that the nine-
6 See C. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41 (1977).
7
 Holmes, Book Review, 11 AM. L. REV. 327 (1877); the Review is unsigned but attributed
to Holmes by M. 1-lowE, jusTicE OLIVER WENDEL. HOLMES: THE PROVING YEARS 147 n.28
(1963).
fi Smith, supra note 4, at 682.
9 Reimann, Holmes' 'Common Law', supra note 5.
Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification, supra note 5, at 101-07.
" See H.A.L. FISHER, FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND 18-19 (1910 & reprint 1984); W.
MARKBY, ELEMENTS OF LAW (1871).
'I See, e.g., J. P. DawsoN, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW, 441-42, 451-59, (1968); 0. ROB-
INSON, T. FERGUSON, W. GORDON, AN INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY 465-72
(1985); P. STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION 51-68, (1980); Gale, A Very German Legal Science: Savigny
and the Historical School, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 123 (1982). There is also a variety of older essays
on the German historical school of law, the most interesting of which is Kantorowicz, Savigny
and the Historical School of Law, 53 L.Q.R. 326 (1937). The multitude of accounts from the
19th and early 20th century of this topic in the Anglo-American literature attests to the
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teenth century concept of legal science originated in Savigny's work,
but even his theory has not been explored in any depth. Some
consider it similar to Anglo-American classical orthodoxy of the
Langdellian kind and recognize that it built on notions of organic
growth and deductive logic, but the meaning and relationship of
these notions remains as obscure as their methodological underpin-
nings and implications.' 3 In sum, German legal science is a phenom-
enon about which Anglo-American scholars have written fairly con-
tinuously without ever pinning down its essence."
This article is the preliminary part of a larger study of the
influence of nineteenth century German jurisprudence on the clas-
sical period of Anglo-American legal thought. In order to provide
the basis for an understanding of the diverse instances and aspects
of this influence, it analyzes the concept of legal science in nine-
teenth century Germany. It is limited, however, in two ways. It
focuses only on the classical concept of "Rechtswissenschaft" that
was debated early in the century, fully developed by the historical
school and later modified by its various offshoots, thus excluding
the new and radically different ideas advanced late in the century
by Jhering and his successors. 15 And it is concerned only with the
common lawyers' considerable interest in German jurisprudence in the 19th and early 20th
century. See, e.g., L. GUSHING, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 269-79 (1854);
N. KORKUNOV, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 143-56 (1909); J. REDDIE, HISTORICAL NOTICES OF
THE ROMAN LAW AND THE RECENT PROGRESS OF ITS STUDY IN GERMANY (1826); Freund,
Historical Jurisprudence in Germany, 5 PoL. Sm. Q. 468 (1890); Leonhard, Methods Followed in
Germany by the Historical School of Law, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1907); Rose, Controversies of
Modern Continental Jurists, 2 S.L. REV. 551 (1876); Anon., On the Schools of German Jurists, VI
MONTHLY L. MAC.. & Pot.. REV. 77 (1838-41?); Anon., The German Historical School of Juris-
prudence, 14 AM. juatsT 43 (1835); see also Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of
Law, 51 Cowm. L. REv. 681,686-89 (1951).
13 See Clark, supra note 5, at 328-30. Grey compares "Anglo-American classical ortho-
doxy" to post-1800 European "legal science" in general but calls Savigny's work its "proto-
type." Grey, supra note 2, at 5 n.17.
14 Robert Stevens, for example, recognizes the importance of German "scienticism" for
the reform of American legal education after 1870, but never defines what this "scienticism"
was. R. STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL 51,134 (1983). The context suggests, however, that Stevens
has the methodology of late 19th century German natural sciences in mind, not the Savignian
notion of legal science. Id. Holmes, in contrast, referred to scientific German historiography
when he said that "[u]nder the influence of Germany, science is gradually drawing legal
history into its sphere." Holmes, The Use and Meaning of Law Schools, and their Methods of
Instruction, 20 Am. L. REv. 919,921 (1886).
° This later 19th century jurisprudence is so different from the one considered here
that it requires a separate study. The jurisprudence of interests, free school of law, and the
sociological jurisprudence developed by German jurists after Jhering have also been influ-
ential in Anglo-American legal thought, particularly on Pound, Cardozo, and some of the
Realists. For a preliminary study, see Herget & Wallace, The German Free Law Movement as the
Source of American Legal Realism, 73 VA. L. REv. 399 (1987).
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jurisprudential dimension of this concept, thus leaving the explo-
ration of its role in the political and social context of nineteenth
century Germany for later study. 16
Even in this limited sense, nineteenth century German legal
science was a highly• complex phenomenon. On one hand, it was
marked by a great diversity of approaches, most of which were
reflected in Anglo-American legal scholarship in one way or an-
other. On the other hand, it was also united under a shared concept
of "Rechtswissenschaft" that Anglo-American scholars have not ex-
tensively explored. In order to trace its origins, to develop the
diversity of its external manifestations, and also to demonstrate the
internal coherence of its basic ideas, this article explores nineteenth
century German legal science in three major steps.°
Laying the foundation, section I describes the birth of German
legal science. The development of a new jurisprudence was the
response to the methodological needs that arose from the decon-
struction of natural law (subsection A). To meet these needs, the
leading scholars explored historical as well as systematic approaches
in their search for a science of positive law (subsection B). The
ensuing jurisprudential debate ended with the victory of a jurispru-
dence that combined both approaches—Savigny's historical theory
of law (subsection C).
Savigny's historical jurisprudence became the seed out of which
a multitude of branches grew. In section II, this article unfolds the
diversity of legal science. One group of scholars pursued the sys-
tematic dimension and was split into those focusing on Roman law,
and others dealing with German law (subsection A). A different
branch emphasized the historical dimension, again partially analyz-
ing Roman law and partially exploring German legal history (sub-
section B). The result was a variety of scholarship that makes it
possible to perceive German jurisprudence in many different ways,
but which also makes it difficult to see the common ideas underlying
the diversity.
In section III, this article analyzes and synthesizes these fun-
damental ideas in order to show how their interplay constituted the
15
 For a study of the political background of the German Civil Code, see M. JOHN,
POLITICS AND THE LAW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY GERMANY (1989).
17
 The discussion in sections 1 and II is based predominantly on original writings of the
historical jurists themselves rather than on modern scholarship about them. While the ex-
position is my own, most of the substantive views presented in these parts are in the public
domain of German legal historiography. Where they are not, the text marks them as mine.
Section 111 presents my own analysis, synthesis and characterization of 19th century German
legal science.
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concept of legal science itself. It first identifies and disentangles the
various notions involved. The major elements constituting the con-
cept of "Rechtswissenschaft" are separated through an analysis of
Savigny's themes of "Geschichte" (history) and "System" (subsection
A). The meaning of' these fundamental concepts is easily misun-
derstood, much to the detriment of a sober appreciation of nine-
teenth century German legal science. Interpreting them only as
products of a romantic veneration of the past, and of a blind faith
in logic, respectively, makes the historical school look hopelessly
irrational in its premises and naively formalistic in its results.' 8
 In
fact, history and system were complex ideas that reflected subtle
methodological considerations.
The identification of the major elements of legal science makes
it possible to demonstrate their interaction. The gist of "Rechtswis-
senschaft" was the synthesis of "Geschichte" and "System" (subsec-
tion B). This synthesis was the fundamental credo of German jurists
throughout the nineteenth century and a basic methodological
problem. It required the reconciliation of historical truth with log-
ical order. Savigny united both concepts by presenting law as a
phenomenon that was rooted in the organic whole of the culture
and that served the protection of individual freedom. These ideas
look, again, very nebulous, but they actually rested on a sophisti-
cated view of the function of modern jurisprudence.
As a result of the combination of historical method, systematic
goal, and individualist function of law, the character of "Rechtswis-
senschaft" was marked by a mixture of positivism, idealism, and
formalism (subsection C). In a concluding section (IV), the article
briefly relates these findings to the perspective of the contemporary
Anglo-American scholars. It suggests, in a preliminary fashion, that
it was the very diversity of German legal science's branches and the
very richness of its basic concept that made it so intriguing for late
nineteenth century common law jurists.
I. THE RISE OF LEGAL SCIENCE
A. The Deconstruction of Natural Law
The new concept of legal science developed by German jurists
near the beginning of the nineteenth century was a response to a
Edwin Patteson provides an example of such"a misunderstanding when he writes that
it was "essential[ly] the thesis of Savigny and the German historical school" that "primitive
or very old legal principles and doctrines are the best ones." Patteson, The Origin of the Case
Method, 4 J. LEG. En. 1, 9 (1951).
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specific methodological challenge. This challenge resulted primarily
from the jurisprudential vacuum left after Kant's critical philosophy
had destroyed the faith in the premises and methods of natural law
that had dominated the previous centuries.' 9
The idea of natural law, rooted in Greek and Roman philoso-
phy, has been an essential part of the Western legal tradition and
has acquired a multitude of meanings throughout the centuries. Its
modern version, "the Law of Reason," which shaped European legal
thought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, finds its ori-
gins in Hobbes, Grotius, Spinoza, Pufendorf and Leibniz. 2° But its
most prominent and influential version in eighteenth century Ger-
many was the school of Christian Wolff. Wolff and his followers
became the main target of the epistemological attacks on natural
law and, particularly for the historical school, the outright symbol
of the flaws of its method. 2 '
The Wolffian approach indeed demonstrates both the appeal
and the weakness of the "Law of Reason" in extreme form. It was
impressive as an exercise in systematic logic, but it was shallow and
confused as a method of jurisprudence. Wolff introduces his phi-
losophy with a few fundamental legal principles. Most of his max-
ims, like the general command not to harm others (neminem laede)
or to give each his due (suum cuique tribuere) were in fact of ancient
origin. But because for Wolff they stemmed directly from human
nature, he considered them to be of eternal, timeless validity, in-
dependent of their historical context. From these generalities, he
deduced increasingly particular rules through quasi-mathematical
operation (more geometrical) down to such detail that these rules
could actually govern legal practice. In this manner, he built a huge,
strictly logical, comprehensive system of natural law. 22
 Wolff's log-
ical method dominated legal theory in eighteenth century Germany.
1°
 Besides the jurisprudential embarassment caused by Kant's work, there was also a
highly practical need for a new legal science. German law was extremely fragmented and
confused and in desparate need of unification and clarification.
2°
 For an excellent discussion of the continental natural law tradition, see F. WIEACKER,
PRIVATRECHTSGESCH/CHTE DER NEUZEIT 249-347 (2nd ed. 1967). See also H. WELZEL, NATUR-
RECHT UND MATERIALS GERECHTIGKEIT (4th ed. 1962).
21 See H. HATTENHAUER, THIBAUT UND SAVIGNY 100 (1973); Savigny, Ober den Zweck dieser
Zeitschrift, 1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1-7 (1815).
24 C. WOLFF, IURIS NATURAE ET GENTIUM (1750); C. WOLFF, JUS NATURAE
METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM (8 vols. 1740-1748). On Wolff, see G. KLEINHEYER &
J. SCHRODER, DEUTSCHE JURISTEN AUS FONF JAHRHUNDERTEN 305-12 (2nd ed. 1983) [here-
inafter KLEINHEvEalScuttOnER]; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 318-20; STINTZING & LANDS-
BERG, GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT, vol. III, part 1, 19-206 (1898)
[hereinafter STINTZING/LANDSBERG vol./part].
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His system also exercised some influence on legislation by providing
a model for codification, particularly in Prussia."
This natural law approach was "philosophy" in the pre-Kantian,
eighteenth century sense. It was general learning that encompassed
ethics, mathematics, natural sciences, law, and other fields. 24 Be-
cause the natural lawyers saw no need rigidly to separate these
disciplines, they saw no harm in deducing positive legal rules from
philosophical principles. 25 In reality, however, the gap between the
"Law of Reason" and the law in the courts was considerable because
the legal practice of the age, the "usus modernus pandectarum," pur-
sued its own muddled course and paid little attention to the spec-
ulative philosophy of the natural lawyers. 26
Despite its impressive logical systems, the "Law of Reason"
suffered from the major methodological weakness that it uncritically
mixed a variety of elements—ethics and law, positive law and ideal
law, observation and speculation. As Kant's critical philosophy even-
tually pointed out with merciless clarity, each of these elements was
of a different nature and therefore required different thought
processes. Mixing up these elements, therefore, led to hopeless
methodological confusion.
When the natural law approach failed to distinguish between
ethics and law, it confused different kinds of standards of conduct.
Kant insisted on their separation. Ethical standards are internal;
that is, they concern one's conscience but cannot be enforced by
external authority. Legal standards are external; that is, they con-
cern one's external behavior and can be enforced, for example, by
the state. Thus, the rules in these two spheres are of a very different
nature. For example, "live honestly" is an ethical but not a legally
enforceable rule; in contrast, "fulfill your contractual obligations"
is a legally enforceable rule, but the internal reasons (ethical or not)
for someone's willingness to obey it are irrelevant to the law. Because
Wolff 's fundamental principles, and indeed the whole system built
'' F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 321, 332.
' Wolff was originally professor of mathematics and philosophy, and assumed a chair
for natural law only later in his career.
23 C. RITTER, DER RECHTSGEDANKE KANTS NACH DEN FROHEN QUELLEN 26-28 (197 1).
26 The "uses modernus pandectarum," the "modern use of the Pandects" (or "Digest," the
most important part of Justinian's Corpus luris Civilis), was the prevailing style of the
practically oriented legal scholarship in 18th century central Europe. As its name indicates,
it used the Roman law for modern purposes. While it must be credited with the development
of many modern legal doctrines, it was not comprehensively systematic and lacked a sound
methodological theory. Particularly 19th century jurists thus considered it inferior to their
own approach and not truly "scientific."
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on them, tried to be both ethical and legal at the same time, they
were confused and lacked analytical value. 27
To make matters worse, the eighteenth century natural law
school also failed to distinguish between the knowledge of actual
rules and the search for ideal standards. Kant's analysis of human
reasoning processes convinced him that there is a fundamental
difference between knowledge gained through experience and
maxims found through the application of pure reason. 28 Kant be-
lieved that both were possible but that they performed very differ-
ent functions. In law, for example, knowledge of actual rules was a
matter of experience (perhaps in the form of memorization) and
therefore empirical. While practically indispensable, such empirical
knowledge could never determine the reasonableness of these rules.
Empirical knowledge could never provide ideal standards. These
ideal standards could only be found completely independently from
all experience, by pure reason alone. 29 In the natural law systems,
however, positive rules and ideal standards were often not distin-
guished at all. This made it impossible to test their validity because
it was unclear whether experience (empirical truth) or pure reason
(abstract reasonableness) was the proper criterion. Thus, the max-
ims of natural law provided no reliable basis for a legal system."
This critique thoroughly discredited the natural law school in
the eyes of the generation of legal thinkers after Kant. 3 ' To remedy
the methodological confusion, Kant divided the natural law field
into several clearly defined disciplines with distinct methods and
goals. Kant first distinguished ethics, dealing with internal standards
27 I. KANT, METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN 214, 218-21 (Akademie Textausgabe 1902) (1797).
25 I. KANT, KRITIK DER REINEN VERNDNFT (KOnigsberg 1781).
" I. KANT, supra note 27, Einleitung in die Rechtslehre B., at 229-30. The standards
found by Kant himself were his so-called categorical imperatives. See id., Einleitung IV., 222—
23.
" As Kant clearly recognized, the natural lawyers' failure to distinguish between ideal
standards and empirical knowledge was rooted in their failure to perceive the fundamental
differences between man-made laws and natural laws. As to the former, the distinction
between (empirical) knowledge of what they are and (philosophical) judgment about what
they ought to be is crucial, while as to the latter this distinction makes no sense.
31 Of course, there were other reasons besides Kant's philosophy for the demise of the
natural law systems. With the rise of the bourgeoisie to first economic and later political
power, the rigid patterns of the general ethical principles of the law of reason became a
straightjacket for an increasingly dynamic and complex society. See Habermas, Wie ist Legi-
timität durch Legalitlit mliglich?, 1987 KRITISCHE JUSTIZ 1, 8. In particular, the bourgeoisie
revolted against the natural law philosophy when this approach manifested itself in the
paternalistic government of the enlightened monarchs. See F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at
348-51.
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of conduct, from law, which concerns externally enforceable con-
duct. Within law, Kant isolated legal philosophy determining ideal
standards (the province of the philosopher applying pure reason)
and the science of positive law (the realm of the jurist drawing on
experience). 32 Hegel endorsed Kant's distinctions, and they became
almost commonplace in the early nineteenth century."
As a result, however, the question of how to pursue these
specialized disciplines arose." Ethics could be left to moral philos-
ophy. In law, the search for ideal standards was the concern of legal
philosophy. Kant demonstrated the application, merits and limits
of pure reason,35 and soon Hegel provided a legal philosophy built
on his own theory of state and law. 36 But the development of a
science of positive law remained a problem for jurists. Here Kant
(and later Hegel) provided little direct guidance. It was clear only
that this science must differ radically from legal philosophy in that
it had to be empirical, not speculative. 37 But how could anything
empirical go beyond mere knowledge, which is essentially memo-
rization, and become a "science?"
B. The Search for a Science of Positive Law
AS early nineteenth century German jurists searched for a new
legal science, they also began to use the term "Rechtswissenschaft." 38
Thus "Rechtswissenschaft" meant from the very beginning legal
science in the limited Kantian sense, a science of positive law. The
methods and goals of such a science of positive law depended, of
course, on the factors that made an intellectual endeavour a "sci-
ence." With respect to this question, again, Kant's critical philosophy
had broken new ground. It had not only discredited the natural
law approach but had also given the term "science," or rather its
German equivalent "Wissenschaft," a new meaning. The change
32 I. KANT, supra note 27, Einleitung in die Rechtslehre A., at 229.
ss G•F•W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 212, at 136 (Knox trans. 1942).
34
 For an in-depth analysis of the methodological implications, see BlOhdorn, 'Kantianer.
and Kant. Die Wende van der Rechtsmelaphysill zur `Wiisenschafr yam pasitiven Recht, in 90 SAVIGNY
ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSGESCHICHTE, ROM. ABT. 305 (1973).
35 1. KANT, supra note 27, Rechtslehre.
36 See G.F.W. HEGEL, supra note 33.
37 See K. KOHLSCHOTTER, VORLESUNGEN OBER DEN BEGRIFF DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
185-86 (1798).
" See generally J. SCHRODER, WISSENSCHAFTSTHEORIE UND LEHRE VON DER 'PRAKTISCHEN
JURISPRUDENZ" AUF DEUTSCHEN UNIVERSITATEN AN DER WENDE ZUM 19. JAHRHUNDERT, 82-
168 (1979).
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from earlier notions was subtle, but of immense significance for the
development of nineteenth century German "Rechtswissenschaft."
In the natural law period, "Wissenschaft" meant ability and
knowledge in the subjective sense, meaning what individuals knew
about a subject matter and what skills they had to prove their
knowledge through logic—the "ability of the mind to demonstrate
everything that one asserts in an undisputable manner on undeni-
able grounds."" This demonstration often took the form of building
a "System." "System" was the order in which the material, like a
treatise or lecture, was presented. It was an external concept because
it signified an external arrangement. The subjective concept of
"Wissenschaft" and the external concept of "System" were not in-
herently connected—one could exist without the other, although
the former was often presented in the form of the latter."
Towards the end of the eighteenth century, a different meaning
emerged. Jurists now understood "Wissenschaft" as the systematic
"whole of knowledge." 41 It meant knowledge in the objective sense—
the product of the human power of cognition, the insight into the
quality and order of things. Such knowledge had to be systematic.
"System" now signified the structure of a field of knowledge. It was
an internal concept because it reflected the inherent structure of its
subject, independent from its external presentation. Objective "Wis-
senschaft" and internal "System" were now inextricably linked.
"Wissenschaft" was characterized by the recognition of a subject's
inherent structure, the "System." 42
Thus, from a Kantian perspective, it was clear that the new
legal science had to meet at least two criteria. First, in order to avoid
the speculation of the Wolffian school, it had to be a science of
positive law only, which required that its method be strictly empir-
ical. Second, in order to be a true "Wissenschaft," it had to develop
the inherent structure of its subject; therefore, its goal had to be a
scientific system.
These two conditions produced the major challenge of devel-
oping a science of positive law. The empirical method required
attention to actual data, the systematic goal the demonstration of
3  "eine Fertigkeit des Verstandes, alles, was man behauptet, aus unwidersprechlichen
Griinden unumstasslich darzutun." Id. at 132 (quoting C. Wotsr, DEUTSCHE LOGIK (1713)).
Whether jurisprudence could qualify as "Wissenschaft" according to these criteria was a
much debated question already in the 18th century. Id. at 133-34.
40 Id. at 88.
41 Das "Ganze der Erkenntnis." Id. at 95.
42 1d. at 94-95, 98-99, 113-15, 130-31, 167-68.
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an order in them. But the establishment of a new science of law
was not only a challenge, it was also a promise. Kant's philosophy
changed not only the meaning of "Wissenschaft" but also its status.
As long as it had meant subjective knowledge, it had been only a
means to an end. In its new sense of the detection of the systematic
structures inherent in the data, it was now an end in itself. It stood
for the goal of a scholarly community and became a normative
concept. In eighteenth century Germany, "Wissenschaftlichkeit"
(scientific character) had not been a value judgment; in nineteenth
century Germany it was the primary indicator of the intellectual
dignity of a discipline.
This new dignity of "Wissenschaft" perhaps explains why the
best legal minds in early nineteenth century Germany all partici-
pated in the development of a new legal science. The heated debates
among the various schools about the proper approach revolved
around three fundamental methodological questions. 43 If legal sci-
ence had to be empirical, where would its data come from? If it
had to build a system, what would this system be like? And what
was the relationship between the empirical and the systematic side?
The answer to the first question—the appropriate source of the
relevant data—gradually emerged as the age of rationalism gave
way to the age of historicism. jurisprudence began to turn away
from the veneration of deductive logic and to consider law a his-
torical phenomenon. Gustav Hugo, the most prominent scholar of
the "GOttinger Rechtsschule," 44
 represented this new trend. For
Hugo, legal science had to explain the reasons behind the positive
rules, and these reasons could be philosophical or historical:
While the immediately practical, trade-like, as it is cor-
rectly called, knowledge of law goes only to the question
What is the law? the scientific knowledge of law asks also
for the grounds, and since they are twofold, the grounds
of reason and the historical ones, two questions follow: Is
something that is law reasonable? and How did it become
law?43
4 For a comprehensive study, see H. STOFILER, DIE DISKUSSION UM DIE ERNEUERUNG DER
REcwrswtssENscitm-r VON 1780-1815 (1978).
44 On Hugo, see KLEINHEYER/SCHRODER, supra note 22, at 128-31; STINTZING/LANDSBERG
111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 1-48; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 378-81.
4 "Statt clan die unmittelbar practische, wie man mit Recht sagt, handwerksmaBige
Rechtserkenntnis nur auf die Frage geht: Was 1st Rechtens? so fragt die wissenschaftliche
auch nach den GrOnden, und da diese doppelt Sind: die Vernunftgrande und die geschicht-
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This concept of a new legal science was still relatively crude, but it
was an important first step. It was not fully "scientific" in the Kantian
sense because it failed to explore the internal structure of its subject,
the scientific system." But it went beyond Kant in an important
respect because it required that a scientific jurisprudence consider
law historically. The data of legal science would have to come from
history.
The answer to the second question—how to build a system out
of the material—slowly developed out of Kant's concept of "Wis-
senschaft." Somehow the mass of empirically discovered data of law
had to be reduced to their underlying principles. These principles
then had to be the organizing criteria for the building of a rational
system. The "historical-philosophical school," mainly Johann Paul
Anselm Feuerbach47 and Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut," best
represents this approach. According to Feuerbach, the construction
of the system required three steps:
The first is the correctness, exact certitude, acute preci-
sion, lucid clarity of the legal concepts, the second the
internal coherence of the legal rules, the third the system-
atic coherence of the legal dogmas. 49
lichen, so entstehen auch die beyden Fragen: 1st es vernunftig, dass Etwas Rechtens sey?
und Wie ist es Rechtens gewordeia?" G. HUGO, LEHRBUCH DER JURISTISCHEN ENCYCLOPADIE,
FUNFTER, GANZ VON NEUEM AUSGEARBEITETER VERSUCH (1817) 32-33.
49 But Hugo followed Kant in his emphasis on positive law and in his concomitant
rejection of metaphysical speculation. For Hugo, "grounds of reason" ("Vernunftgrande")
did not mean philosophical speculation. Hugo did not see much sense in metaphysics "because
in a certain way nothing in positive law, and in a certain way everything fits it" ("denn mit
diesem stimmt gewisser Mallen Nichts, und gewisser Mallen Alles, im wirklichen Rechte,
ilberein"). Id, at 33. Instead, he wanted to look at "what is given through experience, at the
good and bad consequences" ("auf das in der Erfahrung Gegebene, auf die guten und
schlimmen Folgen"). Id. at 33-34. Thus, Hugo wanted to explore positive law, explain it
from its historical background, and test its practical reasonableness.
47 On Feuerbach see E. KIPPER, JOHANN PAUL ANSELM FEUERBACH (2nd ed. 1989); KLEIN-
HEYER/SCHRODER, supra note 22, at 79-85; STINTZING/LANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22,
at 115-39; E. WOLF, GROSSE RECHTSDENKER DER DEUTSCHEN GEISTESGESCHICHTE 543-90 (4th
ed. 1963).
49 On Thibaut See KLEINHEYERISCHRODER, supra note 22, at 287-90; STINTZING/LANDS-
aERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 69-88; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 390-91.
49 "Die erste ist die Richtigkeit, genauer Bestimmtheit, scharfe PrSzision, lichtvolle Klar-
heit der rechtlichen Begriffe: die zweite der innere Zusammenhang der RechtssStze: die
dritte der systematische Zusammenhang der Rechtslehren." Feuerbach, Ober Philosophic und
Empiric in ihrem Verhalinis zur posiiiven flechtswissenschaft, in J. FEUERBACH 8c C. MirrEarimmt,
THEORIE DER ERFAHRUNG IN DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 80 (1804 & 1968 reprint).
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Similarly, Thibaut defined legal science as the "systematic sum total
of laws."5° A "System" consisting of the true principles of the law
had become the mark of "Rechtswissenschaft.""
The third question—the relationship between empirical and
systematic method—turned out to be the hardest. Feuerbach and
Thibaut, among others, only stated that both methods were neces-
sary. As the name of their approach—"historical-philosophical"-
indicated, their method of finding the material of positive law was
empirical, 52 which meant primarily historical, while the technique
that brought this material into a principled order was "philosophi-
cal." "Philosophy" in this context was, particularly for Feuerbach,
the inquiry into the fundamental concepts of law, the reasoning
leading to the recognition of their relationships, and the broad view
of law required to organize them into a system. 53 But the interplay
between the historical and the systematic method remained unclear.
Despite these intense efforts to open a new chapter of juris-
prudence by developing a science of positive law, the influence of
the age of reason still lingered on in this early period of "Rechts-
wissenschaft." After centuries of searching for justice, the jurists
were reluctant suddenly to limit their discipline strictly to the ques-
tion of what the law and its appropriate system is, and to exclude
(and leave to legal philosophy) all thinking about what it ought to
be. For Feuerbach and Thibaut, "philosophy" was not only princi-
pled legal reasoning, it was also measuring the value of the empirical
material by the standards of reason in the Kantian sense. For them,
legal science still had to encompass both the systematization of
empirically found rules and their scrutiny through the powers of
" "Ein systematischer Inbegriff von Gesetzen." A.F.J. THIBAUT, SYSTEM DES PANDEKTEN-
RECHTS 4 (7th ed. 1828).
51 For Thibaut and Feuerbach, however, the "systeth" remained only formal, i.e. a divi-
sion and organization of the positive law into formal categories in order to simplify the legal
material. Thibaut considered a substantive ("materielles") system, i.e. one according to un-
derlying principles, impossible in respect to positive law because the lawgiver does not make
rules according to such substantive principles. Id. Feuerbach also spoke only of the "formal
criteria of a science of positive law" ("f'ormellen Bedingungen einer Wissenschaft vom posi-
tiven Recht"). Feuerbach, supra note 49, at 80. This distinguishes Thibaut's and Feuerbach's
conception of "system" from Savigny's. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
52 On the early nineteenth century concept of empiricism and positivism of law, see
Bliihdorn, Zum Zusammenhang von "Positivildt" and "Empiric" int Verständnis der deutschen Reda-
swissenschaft zu Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts, in Posinvismus IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 123-59 ( J.
BlOhdorn & J. Ritter eds. 1971).
" Feuerbach, supra note 49, at 94-95.
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reason: "Empirical knowledge gives to jurisprudence its body, philo-
sophical knowledge gives it its spirit." 54
Because Feuerbach and Thibaut presumed normative thinking
about positive law to be part of a jurist's task, they were among the
leading advocates of legal reform in their day. Confident that the
application of post-Kantian, practical reason provided guidance, 55
they called for legal improvement through modern, enlightened,
and rational legislation. The best-known example of this program
is Thibaut's call for a comprehensive German codification in 1814. 56
C. The Historical Theory of Law
When Thibaut's call for a German code met with the passionate
opposition of Friedrich Karl von Savigny 57 in the so-called codifi-
cation debate, 58 the historical school of law was born. A major reason
for Savigny's objection to codification was that he did not share,
indeed firmly rejected, Thibaut's (and Feuerbach's) belief in reason
as an important element of legal science." Against their "ahistorical
school" that valued reason more highly than tradition, Savigny de-
veloped his historical theory of law. Taking Kant seriously, he un-
equivocally broke with the law of reason, firmly excluded all spec-
54 Id. at 98; we also Thibaut, Ober den Einfluss der Philosophie auf die Auslegung der positiven
Gesetze, in I VERSUCHE OBER EINZELNE THEILE DES POSITIVEN RECHTS 124-75 (1817).
55
	 supra note 49, at 97-98.
58 A.F.J. THIBAUT, UBER DIE NOTHWENDIGKEIT EINES ALLGEMEINEN BORGERL1CHEN




literature on Savigny is vast. The most important works in German are: J.
RUCKERT, IDEALISMUS, JURISPRUDENZ UND POLITIK BEI FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY (1984);
A. STOLL, FRIEDRICH KARL VON SAVIGNY (1927-39); F. WIEACKER, GRONDER UND BEWAHRER
107-43 (1959); E. WOLF, supra note 47, at 467-542. For a biography in English, see Mont-
morency, Friedrich Karl von Savigny, in GREAT JURISTS OF THE WORLD 561 ( J. Macdowell &
E. Manson eds. 1914).
58 For a brief summary of the principal arguments, see Reimann, The Historical School
Against Codification, supra note 5, at 97-98, and the literature cited supra note 12. For a subtle
and preceptive analysis see J. RUCKERT, supra note 57, at 161-93.
5u Of course, the disagreement between Thibaut and Savigny had many more aspects.
The contestants were cultural symbols for different ages, political agendas and methodolog-
ical approaches. Set J. RUCKERT, supra note 57, at 160-61; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at
395-96. Thibaut as well as Feuerbach were highly critical of the historical school because
Savigny excluded philosophical elements (in the sense of testing law through reason) from
the realm of legal science. See infra note 160 and accompanying text. On the background of
Savigny's turning away from idealist philosophy, see Jacobs, Des Ursprung der geschichtlichen
Rechtswissenschaft in der Abwendung Savignys von der idealistischen Philosophie, 1989 Tijdschrift
voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 241.
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ulation about justice from the realm of legal science, and developed
a jurisprudence strictly limited to positive law. His approach pro-
vided the long-sought answers to the basic methodological questions
concerning positive legal science. Savigny became the true founder
of modern German "Rechtswissenschaft." 6°
Savigny endorsed Hugo's idea of looking at the historical roots
of the law as a means to discover the data of legal science. He
agreed with Feuerbach and Thibaut on the goal of building a sys-
tem. And he also considered both the empirical-historical and the
systematic methods necessary. But he went beyond his colleagues'
theories in all three respects. First, his concept of the historical
nature of law was new and idiosyncratic. Second, his idea of the
envisaged system was more sophisticated than that of Feuerbach
and Thibaut. And finally, Savigny developed a concept for the
combination of both the historical and the systematic aspects. These
three dimensions of Savigny's thought are the hallmarks of the
historical school he established. Each will be considered in turn. 61
Savigny's view of law as a historical phenomenon that he ex-
pressly presented as a counterpart to the Wolffian school was com-
plex and subtle. 62
 Its major elements were that law was essentially
custom originally emanating from the people, that in later stages of
civilization it was administered by the learned jurists, and that it
evolved organically over time.
"" At least one commentator disagrees and considers Hugo and Feuerbach the true
founders of modern German legal science. Undeniably these scholars first laid the method-
ological foundations on which Savigny built, so that the originality of his ideas must not be
overrated. H. Sr0FILEE, supra note 43. But Savigny went way beyond his predecessors. See
infra notes 62-76 and accompanying text. Furthermore, in terms of influence on the course
of 19th century German jurisprudence, Savigny is clearly the most important thinker.
Savigny developed his concept of legal science in four major works. He laid the early
foundations in his JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE of 1802-03. F.C.V. SAVIGNY, JURISTISCHE
METHODENLEHRE (G. Wesenberg ed. 1951) (1802-03) [hereinafter SAVIGNY, METHODEN-
LEHRE}. He developed his full-blown historical theory of law over a decade later in two essays—
his reply to Thibaut, Vain Beruf unserer Zeit far Gesetzgefrung and Rechtswissenschaft (1814)
(reprinted in H. HATTENHAUER, THIBAUT UND SAVIGNY 95 (1973) [hereinafter SAVIGNY, BERuF])
(for an English translation, see A. HAYWARD, ON THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGIS-
LATION AND JURISPRUDENCE (1831) [hereinafter VocATtomp, and his introductory essay for
the journal he founded with Eichhorn, Ober den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift, 1 ZEITSCHRIFF FOR
GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1 (1815). He stated his theory again in the first volume
of SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS (1840) [hereinafter SAVIGNY, SYSTEM I]. During
the 37 years between the METHODENLEHRE and the SYSTEM, Savigny's ideas changed to some
extent, but his basic theory remained virtually the same.
42 See STINT2INCILANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 207.
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For Savigny, law as custom was the result of "internal silently-
operating powers" working within the people." Like language, it
reflected a people's indigenous character. It was therefore an ex-
pression of what Savigny later called the "Volksgeist," the spirit of
the people. 64 It is easy to dismiss this idea as hopelessly nebulous.
While it undeniably contains a romantic element, 65 Savigny's theory
of the "Volksgeist" is not nearly as fanciful as it seems. "Volksgeist"
had a very specific meaning. "Volk" in this context was neither a
social nor an empirical, but instead a cultural concept. And "Geist"
was not, like Hegel's "Weltgeist," a highly abstract intellectual entity,
but the concrete, generally shared cultural characteristics of a peo-
ple. "Volksgeist" then meant the character of a nation as a culture.
The law was part of this character. The law's "essence is the life of
man itself, viewed from one particular perspective." As such, Sa-
vigny postulated in a modern manner, it "has no independent ex-
istence."66 Its essence is not philosophy or reason, but the expression
of cultural characteristics. Therefore, it was a historical and not a
metaphysical phenomenon.
Savigny claimed that in advanced stages of civilization, this
customary law lay in the hands no longer of the common people
but of the academic jurists. At first glance, the leadership of spe-
cialized experts appears to be inconsistent with the roots of the law
in the spirit of the whole people. But the notion of the "Volksgeist"
as the essence of a nation's culture requires further qualification.
Savigny's concept of "culture" was not anthropological but intellec-
69 VOCATION, supra note 61, at 30 ("innere, stillwirkende Krafte"); SAVIGNY, BERUF, supra
note 61, at 105.
" SAVIGNY, SYSTEM 1, supra note 61, at 14. The term "Volksgeist" was not Savigny's, but
Puchta's invention. Savigny adopted it from Puchta. In his earlier works, he only used the
term "common consciousness of the community," VOCATION, supra note 61, at 28
("BewuBtsein des gesammten Volkes,"); SAVIGNY, BEstur, supra note 61, at 104. For further
information about the origins of the "Volksgeistlehre" and for a critical evaluation, see
Kantorowicz, Volkgeist and Higorische Rechisschule (1912), in LIU. KANTOROWICZ, RECHTSHIS-
ToRlscHE ScHRival.; 435 (Coing/Immel eds. 1970). Kantorowicz was generally critical of
Savigny's historical theory of law. See Kantorowicz, Was 1st uns Savigny?, id. at 597.
69 The Germanists more fully developed this element than Savigny himself did. See infra
note 122 and accompanying text for a similar point about the Germanists' attitude toward
the historical method.
64 "Das Recht n3mlich hat kein Daseyn far sich, sein Wesen vielmehr ist das Leben der
Menschen selbst, von einer besonderen Seite angesehen." SAVIGNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at
114-15 (here the translation into English is not Hayward's, which is awkward, but my own).
Savigny concluded that legal science must look to reality in order to avoid falling into empty
formalism. VOCATION, supra note 61, at 47; SAVIGNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at 115.
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tual. "Culture" was not the totality of habits of a people, but the
characteristics of its intellectual life. When this life grew more so-
phisticated over time, the ideas of intellectual elites in their respec-
tive fields shaped it more and more. In respect to law, therefore,
the jurists represented the nation as a culture. 67
Savigny saw the law not only as a customary but also as a
historically developing phenomenon. It grew organically over time.
Again, one must be careful to avoid misunderstanding. When Sa-
vigny considered the development of law, he did not have legal
practice in mind, but the ideas of the jurists. The growth of law,
the path of the "Volksgeist," was the organic development of its
intellectual principles.
Savigny's historical view of law determined his notion of legal
science. As law was historical by nature, legal science must become
historical. This again has often been misunderstood. It did not mean
historical studies for their own sake, because the goal was not a
glorification, nor even a description, of the past. Instead, it meant
a science of positive law aiming at the detection of its innermost
principles. But because positive law was the result of historical de-
velopment, these principles must be found in law's historical di-
mension. The study of the past was only a tool. Savigny envisaged
not "Rechtsgeschichte" (legal history), but "geschichtliche Rechts-
wissenschaft" (historical legal science). 68
Once the leading principles had been found, the historical work
had been done. Legal science could turn away from the sources,
leaving them to the archives and to antiquarian research. 69 The
legal scientists could then begin to build a truly scientific system
with these principles. Of course, the construction of this system did
not mean that from this point on law could be treated as static. By
understanding its history, the legal scientists had, so to speak, only
caught up with its growth up to the present. The leading principles
of the law were themselves organic and thus demanded further
growth. But the jurists now fully understood these principles and
could therefore develop the system of law in accordance with them
rather than in violation of them.
Savigny's idea of such a system was more refined than the
concepts of his predecessors. 7° For Savigny, the system was not "a
67 VOCATION, supra note 61, at 28-30; SAVIGNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at 109-05.
65 Hence the title of his journal as Zeitschrift far geschidaliche Rechtswissenschaft (founded
1815).
SAVIGNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at 176.
70 See infra notes 162-70 and accompanying text. Savigny's terminology was somewhat
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mere framework, a convenient aggregate of the material" which
would be "only a facilitation of memory."" Instead, he saw "the
essence of the systematic method in the recognition and demon-
stration of the internal coherence or relationship, through which
the individual legal concepts and rules are united into one great
whole." 72 After Kant, only such a system could be recognized as
scientific because only it could reflect the internal structure of legal
science itself. Methodologically, that meant that the system would
"define the relationship of the individual norms to one another, to
determine what must be connected and what kept separate. For
example, property rights and obligations must be kept separate." 7 S
Furthermore, "in every individual part of the system the relation-
ship between rule and exception must be exactly demonstrated.""
Finally, Savigny believed that legal science was possible only
through a combination of both the historical and the systematic
method. The historical studies provided the material (the leading
principles revealed over time) to which the system then gave the
proper scientific form. And, more importantly; the two methods
actually pursued the same goal, albeit in different dimensions.
The given variety of law . . . is twofold, namely in part
contemporaneous, and in part successive, which necessar-
ily requires a twofold scientific treatment. The reduction
of the contemporaneous variety to its inherent unity is the
systematic method . . .. The treatment of the successive
variety, however, is the truly historical method. 75
confusing in this area. Occasionally, Savigny used the term "philosophisch" (philosophical)
instead of "systematisch" (systematic). See, e.g., SAVIGNY, METHODENLEHRE, supra note 61, at
15. "Philosophie" in this context was the systematic method, not (natural law) metaphysics of
pure (Kantian) reason.
71 SAVIGNY, METHODENLEHRE, supra note 61, at 16. "[Elfin bloBes Fachwerk, eM bequemes
Aggregat der Materien," "bloBe Erleichterung des Gedachtnisses." Id.
SAVIGNY, SYSTEM 1, supra note 61, at.XXXV1. "[D]as Wesen der systematischen Meth-
ode ist die Erkenntnis und Darstellung des inneren Zusammenhangs oder der Verwandt-
schaft, wodurch die einzelnen Rechtsbegriffe und Rechtsregeln zu einer groBen Einheit
verbunden werden."
" SAVIGNY, METHODENLEHRE, supra note 61, at 39. "Das Verhaltnis der einzelnen Re-
chtssatze untereinander bestimmt, was getrennt und verbunden werden muss. So milssen z.
B. Real und Obligationenrechte getrennt werden." Id.
74 Id. In jedem einzelnen Teil des Systems mull genau das Verhaltnis zwischen Regel
und Ausnahme dargestellt werden." Id.
" Savigny, Rezension von Gänner, Ober Gesetzgebung and Rechtsuissenschaft in unserer Zeit, in
1 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESCHICHTLIGHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 395 (1815). "Dieses gegebene Man-
nichfaltige ... aber ist selbst zwiefach, namlich theils ein gleichzeitiges, theils ein successives,
woraus nothwendig auch eine zwiefache wissenschaftliche Behandlung entstehen muss. Das
Zurfickfiihren des gleichzeitig Mannichfaltigen auf die ihm innewohnende Einheit ist das
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Thus it was the very combination of both methods that made Sa-
vigny's concept of jurisprudence "truly scientific." 76 Only both meth-
ods together could achieve the goal of science—the detection of
unity and order in apparent variety and chaos.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, the state
of the law was a far cry from such unity and order. Confusion
abounded with respect to the meaning and authority of the sources,
the historical development of doctrine, the essence of legal concepts,
and their relationship with each other. The work of establishing a
"Rechtswissenschaft," through first historical, then systematic stud-
ies had yet to be done. Because he was both a theorist of legal
science and the foremost legal scholar of his age, Savigny himself
took the lead in doing this work.
Savigny's reputation as the founder of modern German legal
science rests in large part on his accomplishments in actually carry-
ing out his proposals. In 1803, at the age of 24, the young professor
at the University of Marburg published "Das Recht des Besitzes." 77
Using a limited topic, possession, he demonstrated how historical
research could isolate the leading ideas from the original records.
Through meticulous analysis of the Roman law sources, he showed
that the classical Roman law of possession rested on a few clear
principles that were only later confused by the medieval scholars.
Putting the medieval aberrations aside and using the principles he
found in the classical period, Savigny developed a concept of pos-
session that easily surpassed prior definitions in sophistication and
clarity. The book at once established Savigny as one of the leading
Roman law scholars and was admired by jurists all over the world.
When Savigny, in later years, undertook a comprehensive re-
working of the law, he successively employed the two methods he
had advocated in his programmatic works. He first proceeded to
study the historical development of law. Devoting two decades of
his life to this project, he produced the six volumes of his "Ge-
schichte des rtimischen Rechts im Mittelalter."78 Despite many in-
accuracies, this work has continued to set the standard in its field.
After the completion of the historical task, Savigny began to build
the system of law he envisaged. While his "System des heutigen
systematische Verfahren ... Die Behandlung des successiv Mannichfaltigen dagegen 1st das
eigentlich historische Verfahren." Id.
"Id. at 396. Das Verfahren als "acht wissenschaftlich[es]." Id.
F.C.V. SAVIGNY, DAS RECHT DES BESITZES (1803).
78
 F.C.V. SAVIGNY, GESCHICHTE DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS IM MITTELALTER (6 vols. 1815—
1831).
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ramischen Rechts" remained incomplete," it was a powerful dem-
onstration of his synthetic abilities and soon enjoyed a worldwide
reputation. It laid the foundation for later systematic treatises in
which nineteenth century German "Rechtswissenschaft" would cul-
minate.
Impressive as Savigny's practical demonstration of his new legal
science was, it was also severely limited. Savigny considered only a
narrow range of law, and he considered it from a narrow perspec-
tive. These limitations became highly important for the further
development of German legal science.
Savigny circumscribed the material that he addressed in several
ways. He focused almost exclusively on private law—property
rights, domestic relations, contracts, delicts, and inheritance—while
he excluded constitutional, administrative and other public law as
a concern of politics, not of legal science. 8° Moreover, Savigny stud-
ied only the Roman sources. While he expressly claimed that his
scientific method could, and indeed should, also be applied to the
Germanic elements of the law, he never paid anything but lipservice
to them and thus put German legal science on a Romanist track.
Savigny limited this Roman private law track further because he
limited his attention mostly to the texts of the learned jurists and
the legal concepts developed by them. His history of Roman law
was mainly an intellectual history of Roman law scholarship, and
his system of Roman law was built on ideas, not rules in practice.
Savigny considered even this limited material from a narrow
perspective that resulted from a narrow, formalist view of the func-
tion of law. Law served only to limit private spheres of freedom in
such a way that these spheres could coexist in a society. Its concern
was not to find the true idea of justice, or to be fair to the parties
under the particular circumstances of a case. It drew only the "in-
visible line" 8 ' at which one individual's freedom had to end because
another one's began. In the historical material, Savigny therefore
was looking only for the abstract principles that governed the re-
lationships and dealings among private individuals.
79 F.C.v. SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTICEN Re)MISCHEN REGHTS, (8 vols. 1840-1849). These
First 8 volumes contained primarily the general doctrines. Of the more specific topics, Savigny
only managed to treat the law of obligations in the two volumes of DAs OSLIGATIONENRECHT
(1851-1853).
89 Savigny made a conscious choice to exclude constitutional law from legal science as
early as in the METHODENLEHRE, supra note 61, at 12. Constitutional law concerned the very
existence of the state while legal science dealt with its (lawmaking) activity.
B SAvicxv, SYSTEM I, supra note 61, at 331. "[U]nsichtbare Grãnze."
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These two limitations were directly connected. The writings of
the classical Roman jurists presented a law that was predominantly
private, essentially individualist, and rationally formal. It would be
hard to determine whether Savigny focused on the Roman sources
because they matched his preconceived view of the function of law,
or whether instead his view was a result of dealing with the Roman
material. However this may be, Savigny's ideas and the Roman
jurists' approach were highly congenial.
As a consequence of these limitations, and despite all claims to
the contrary, Savigny's legal science was narrow in its focus and
abstract in its character. For the coming generations, the theory of
Savigny's "Rechtswissenschaft" provided a powerful model, the in-
fluence of which no nineteenth century German jurist escaped. But
its limitations also became the source of criticism and conflict.
II. THE DIVERSITY OF LEGAL SCIENCE
All German legal thinkers after Savigny built on his work, but
different scholars developed different aspects of Savigny's ideas in
different directions. Legal scholarship split mainly along the two
lines that were foreshadowed in Savigny's approach. One division
concerned the method used and divided the jurists into systematiz-
ers and historians. The other split concerned the material explored,
and grouped jurists into Romanists and Germanists.
As a result, four major approaches can be distinguished. The
systematic method was most rigorously applied to the Roman law
material and led to the construction of highly complex systems of
private law. Where this systematic approach was used to study the
German sources, a system of German law was built as a counterpart
to its Romanist competitor. The historical method was, again, ap-
plied to the Roman element of the civil law tradition and generated
impressive scholarship on Roman legal history. And it was also used
to explore the Teutonic and Germanic past and to write a history
of German law. 82
I37 This picture of nineteenth century German jurisprudence is not complete. It omits
several minor branches because of their inferior importance. But it excludes also the Hegelian
school, which had a strong impact on constitutional theory and law. But despite this impor-
tance, the Hegelians exercised no significant influence on the concept of legal science itself
because it was by and large limited to private law. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
Thus, 19th century Anglo-American scholars paid little attention to the Hegelian school.
Despite many similarities between their approaches (postulate of a science of positive
law, historical and idealistic bent, belief in organic concepts), most Hegelians were ardent
opponents of the historical school. Hegel himself blamed Savigny for denying that his era
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These four main approaches are, however, only Weberian ideal
types. In reality, the divisions were not entirely strict. While the split
into Romanists and Germanists was mostly clear, systematic and
historical methods were often combined, very much in Savigny's
spirit. Thus, the characterization of leading scholars as represen-
tatives of certain branches is frequently a question of their emphasis
on, rather than their exclusive use of, one method or another.
A. The Systematic Dimension: The Roman and the German Law
Savigny's most immediate legacy was the perfection of the sys-
tematic treatment of Roman law. This approach became the most
important form of German legal scholarship at the time. Dominat-
ing in Germany and widely influential abroad, the "Pandektenwis-
senschaft," as it was later called, was the branch most frequently
identified with German legal science in general. The story begins
with the conceptual jurists' refinement of the systematic method
and ends with its practical application to the Roman law material
by the Pandectists. This combination of method and material gen-
erated the great systematic treatises of the second half of the cen-
tury, and finally the codification of German private law.
Savigny had demonstrated the systematic approach in his System
of Modern Roman Law," but the work had remained incomplete both
in coverage and in the execution of the systematic program. It still
rested more on rules than on underlying principles, and it did not
yet present a perfect legal order. Savigny's method required refine-
ment if the ultimate system was going to be built. This system had
to consist of the basic concepts of law and show their overall organic
coherence.
To achieve this goal, Savigny's Romanist disciples went beyond
his original historical theory of law and turned his systematic ap-
proach into "Begriffsjurisprudenz," or conceptual jurisprudence.
They undertook to isolate the basic concepts in their purity, orga-
nize them logically, and create a system that was gapless and self-
reproductive. The two most prominent conceptual jurists were
had the ability for codification. G.F.W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1821), 136 (Knox
trans. 1942). The conflict between Hegel's disciple Eduard Gans, the first to attempt to write
a universal history of law, see E. GANS, ERBRECHT IN WELTGESCHICHTLICHER Enrrwtcnumn (4
vols. 1829-35), and Savigny was so bitter that Savigny practically retired from the faculty of
the University of Berlin when Gans joined it. For a brief overview of the Hegelian school,
see F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 413-15. See also Schild, Savigny and Hegel, in 18-19
SAVIGNY V LA CIENCIA JURIDICA DEL SIGNO XIX 271 (1978-79).
" See supra note 79.
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Georg Friedrich Puchta and Rudolf von Jhering. Each represents
a different version of this approach.
Puchta, Savigny's immediate successor on the chair for Roman
law at the University of Berlin," expressly followed his predecessor
in the assumption that the historical and the systematic components
were equally essential for legal science. 85 But in his work, he ne-
glected historical studies while he drove the systematic method to
new extremes." For Puchta, the "System" had a higher meaning
than for Savigny. It was not only a reflection of "the internal co-
herence which connects the parts of the law" 87 but instead the very
essence of law itself: "the law itself is a system." 88 Puchta postulated,
and set out to construct in his works, a comprehensive order of the
concepts of positive law that organized them according to their
internal relationship and the hierarchy of their generality. From
the most general concepts, he deduced increasingly particular ones
and in this manner created a pyramid of concepts in which all parts
were logically interconnected. 89
A perhaps even more important step beyond Savigny was the
assumption that the system itself was capable of generating new law.
Its logic was not only organizational but also productive. The basis
for this claim was Puchta's refinement of Savigny's "Volksgeist"
theory. Puchta agreed that the law emanated from the spirit of the.
people, and that the jurists were its keepers in advanced times. But
he distinguished three kinds of law stemming from different
sources: customary law emanating directly from the people (Yolks-
recht), legislative law coming from the lawgiver (Gesetzesrecht), and
the law of the jurists created by legal science ( Juristenrecht). 9°
Puchta went beyond Savigny when he claimed that legislation and
legal science were not only advanced expressions of originally cus-
tomary law, but sources of law in their own right. "Thus science is
not only a receptive activity . . . but also a productive one. It is itself
84
 On Puchta, see J. BOHNERT, UBER DIE RECHTSLEHRE GEORG FRIEDRICH PUCHTAS (1975);
KLEINHEYER/SCHRÔDER, supra note 22, at 205-08; STINTZING/LANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra
note 22, at 439-61; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 399-402.
85 C.F. PUCHTA, CURSUS DER 1NSTITUTIONEN 99-100 (2d ed. 1845).
See W. WILHELM, ZUR JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 76-80
(1958).
87 Des "inneren Zusammenhangs, welcher die Theile des Rechts verbindet," PUCHTA,
supra note 85, at 100.
se
	 "das Recht selbst eM System ist." Id.
39 This method and system was similar in some respects to the law of reason. See infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
99 G.F. PUCHTA, DAS GEWOHNHEITSRECHT (2 vols., 1828-37).
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a source of law, besides customary law and legislative law there is
scientific law."9 ' At advanced stages of development customary law
became less important, while legislation and, most of all, legal sci-
ence became more important.
Puchta considered his era ready for the dominance of legal
science. As a result, the jurists must not only systematize the already
existing legal material, but create the new scientific law. This crea-
tion had to take place in the system. New rules could be deduced
from given principles, and even new concepts could be created
through the combination or division of existing ones. All scientific
law originated from within the system's logic.
Puchta has frequently been blamed for the abstractness of his
approach. It is undeniable that his exaltation of the conceptual
system entailed the risk of losing sight of social and political realities.
But his jurisprudence was not the result of a complete lack of
practical sense or of blindness to the realities of social and political
life. As some scholars have pointed out, Puchta demonstrated
awareness for practical solutions as well as a keen perception of the
political forces around him. 92 But even these scholars have failed to
consider a favorable interpretation of his belief in the power of
conceptual logic. One can see this belief as the conviction that the
concepts and their systematic coherence reflect basic structures of
reality. In their abstract form, as a meta-language, they allow a
concentrated discourse through which new structures, otherwise not
visible, come to light.
Twenty years after Puchta, conceptual jurisprudence reached
its high-water mark in the theories of Rudolf von Jhering. 93 Jher-
91 "So ist die Wissenschaft nicht bloss eine receptive Thatigkeit (Interpretation der Ges-
etze und des Gewohnheitsrechts), sondern auch eine productive. Sie ist selbst eine Re-
chtsquelle, neben das Gewohnheitsheitsrecht und das gesetzliche Recht tritt ein Recht der
Wissenschaft." G.F. PUCHTA, VORLESUNGEN UBER DAS HEUTIGE ROMISCHE RECHT 39 (2d ed.
1849).
92
 R. OGOREK, RICHTERKONIG ODER SUBSUMPTIONSAUTOMAT 198-211 (1986); F.
WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 400.
95 The following paragraphs consider only Jhering's early jurisprudence. In the 1860s,
Jhering's legal thought underwent a radical change as he turned away from conceptual
jurisprudence and Pandektenwissenschaft and embraced a new, sociological concept of law.
See R. VON JHERING, DER KAMPF UMS RECHT (THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW) (1872); R. VON JHERING,
ZWECK IM RECHT (LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END) (2 vols. 1877-83). This tater Jhering
anticipated much of legal realism. See R. VON JHERING, 1 VOM GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS
AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER ENTWICKLUNG (9th ed. 1907) 31-35, thereinafter
JHERING, GEIST II. As explained in the introduction, this article does not address these later
developments.
On Jhering, see KLEINHEYER/SCHRODER, supra note 22, at 132-37; STINTEING/LANDSHERG
862	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:837
ing's approach went beyond Puchta's ideas mainly in two ways.
Jhering departed from Puchta (and from Savigny) when he de-
manded the liberation of legal science from the substance of Roman
law, and when he gave conceptual jurisprudence a peculiarly nat-
uralist form.
After decades of research in classical Roman law, even the
Romanists began to tire of the Digest by the middle of the century.
There was a growing consensus that its substance had been suffi-
ciently absorbed. The close attention to the classical jurists' works
that Savigny had demanded seemed no longer necessary. Instead,
Roman law could now be used more freely and could even be
disregarded where modern needs required modern solutions. 94
Jhering admonished his contemporaries to face the fact that "the
times of Ulpian and Paulus are gone forever and will not return
despite all efforts. To wish to retrieve them one would have to
forget that every age should be an original, and not the copy of
another."95
 As a turf for intellectual practice, however, Jhering held
the classical Roman law in the highest esteem. Thus, the goal of his
"Spirit of the Roman Law" was to distill the essence of the classical
jurists' methods in order to use them for "general science of the
nature and manifestations of law as such."96 Jhering intended to
absorb the methodological essence of Roman law but to end the
slavish adherence to its substance.97
While the jurists gradually escaped the spell of the classical
Roman law, they came more and more under the influence of the
natural sciences, which produced impressive results and gained
intellectual prestige around the middle of the century. Ideas from
physics, cheinistry and biology became attractive to the jurists, who
sought ways to master the legal universe as the natural scientists
were mastering the natural universe. Jhering's version of conceptual
jurisprudence attests to this new trend. When he named his ap-
proach the "natural-historical method," he indicated that he consid-
ered it a new, "natural" version of historical legal science.
111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 788-825; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 450-53; E. Wats,
supra note 47, at 622-68.
94 See STINTZING/LANDSBERG 111.3 (1910), supra note 22, at 743-50
05 "[D]ie Zeiten von Ulpian und Paulus sind flu immer vortiber und werden trotz aller
Remilhungen nicht wiederkehren. Um sie zurtickzuwiinschen, muss man vergessen, dal3 jede
Zeit Original und nicht Kopie einer andern sein soil." JHER1NG, GEIST 1, supra note 93, at 47.
96 "[E]ine allgemeine Lehre von der Natur und Erscheinungsform des Rechts Ober-
haupt." Id. at 23.
97 E. Wats, supra note 47, at 633-36.
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The "natural-historical method" consisted of three steps. First,
"analysis" broke down the complexity of legal rules and relation-
ships into individual elements. It established a list of the building
blocks of the law, a "legal alphabet." Second, "concentration" dis-
tilled the fundamental concepts from the individual rules, for ex-
ample the concept of contract from the rules governing contractual
relationships. Third, "construction" built a system by organizing the
elements and concepts according to their internal relationship. In
this system, the law was elevated to a "higher state of aggregation."98
Its essence
does not (only) lie in the fact that the law cannot be under-
stood without its systematic coherence, because this is the
case (also) with any (other) object of knowledge .... In
law, the distinctive characteristic of the systematic task is
that the particular is not only, as in any other science, put
in its right place, but that this formal process has a sub-
stantive effect on the subject matter, that this procedure
causes an internal transubstantiation of the maxims of law.
The maxims of law take on an elevated condition, they
strip off their quality as commands and prohibitions and
form themselves into the elements and qualities of legal
institutions . .. . A layman ... would hardly deem it
possible . . . how in the legal concepts, classifications, etc.,
in short, in the dogmatic logic, there can be a practical
meaning more intensive than in the maxims of law. This
logic of the law is, so to speak, the blossom, the praecipitat
of the maxims of law; in one single, correctly stated con-
cept there lies perhaps the substantive contents of ten
prior maxims of law."
9' R. VON JIIERING, 2 GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS, 361 (7th ed. 1907). For a more
complete description of Jhering's method, see W. WILHELM, ZUR JURISTISCHEN METHODEN-
LEHRE IM 19. JAHRHUNDERT 112-16 (1955).
99 Seine Bedeutung "besteht nicht darin, &Li das Recht ohne seinen systematischen
Zusammenhang nicht verstanden werden kann, dens das ist bei jedem Gegenstande der
Erkenntnis der Fall ... Bei dem Rechte besteht nun das Unterscheidende der systematischen
Thatigkeit darin, daB dadurch nicht bloB wie bei jeder andern Wissenschaft das einzelne an
seine richtige Stelle gebracht wird, sondern daB dieser formale Prozel3 eine materielle Wick-
wirkung auf den Staff austibt, daB durch diese Procedur mit den Rechtssatzen eine innere
Umwandlung vor sich geht. Die Rechtssatze treten gewissermallen in einen hohern Aggre-
gatzustand, sie streifen ihre Form als Gebote und Verbote ab und gestalten sich zu Elementen
und Qualitaten der Rechtsinstitute . Ein Laic ... warde es kaum fur mOglich halten . .
wie den Rechtsbegriffen, Eintheilungen u.s.w, kurz der dogmatischen Logik eine intensivere
praktische Bedeutung innewohnen kann als den Rechtssatzen. Diese Logik des Rechts ist
gewissermassen die Bliithe, das Pracipitat der Rechtssatze; in einen einzigen richtig gefaBten
Begriff ist vielleicht der praktische Inhalt von zehn fritheren Rechtssatzen aufgenornmen."
JHERING, GEIST I, supra note 93, at 36-37,
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Jurisprudence thus went beyond mere interpretation and organi-
zation of the given material and turned into a "free art and science;
into an art which molds and forms the material artfully, and which
breathes life into it, into a science which can be called, despite the
positive character of its object, a natural science in the realm of the
intellect." 100
The "Begriffsjurisprudenz," in Puchta's original or in Jhering's
later naturalist version, reduced law to a game of induction and
deduction. Scientific truth and thus the authority of a scientific legal
rule did not depend on its historical documentation, practical sense,
or social utility but only on its logical connection with the totality of
the overall system. The law was no longer a product of history, but
a creature of logic.
This conceptual jurisprudence pervaded German legal thought
in the middle decades of the century. Its predominance attested to
the waning influence of Savigny's original conception of the histor-
ical school. To be sure, many of Savigny's fundamental tenets—the
focus on positive law, renewed efforts to study the past, and the
concept of a system as a reflection of the inherent structure of the
law—had by now been absorbed into the mainstream of jurispru-
dence. In that sense, all German legal science was part of the his-
torical school. The majority of the Romanists, however, no longer
pursued the unity of historical and systematic method. -Puchta's and
Jhering's work caused a split of the Romanist scholars into the many
who, under their leadership, pursued modern dogmatic studies but
abandoned all serious historical inquiry, and the few who became
legal historians without much interest in the present.'°' It is fre-
quently overlooked that the Romanists thereby abandoned Savigny's
main ideal—the processing of the actual historical material into an
organic system that presented_the unity of history and order in legal
science.
Several factors caused the decline in adherence to Savigny's
original program towards the middle of the century. By the 1840s,
much historical work had already been done, as Savigny himself
indicated, 102
 while the promise of the systematic method remained
strong. The powers of the first generation of the historical school,
1 D° "[Flreie[n] Kunst und Wissenschaft; zu einer Kunst, die den Scoff Ittinstlerisch bildet,
gestaltet, ihm Leben einhaucht, und zu einer Wissenschaft, die trotz des Positiven in ihrem
Gegenstande sich als Naturwissenschaft auf geisdgem Gebiet bezeichnen laBt." R. VON JHER-
ING, 2 GEtsr DES ROMISCHEN RECUT'S 361 (7th ed. 1907).
101 See STINTZ1NG/LANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 459-60.
102 SAVIGNY, SYSTEM 1, supra note 61, at XIII, XVI.
July 1990]	 GERMAN LEGAL SCIENCE 	 865
including Savigny, were waning. And the age of romanticism, to
which Savigny's historical bent and his idea of the "Volksgeist" had
appealed 's° much, came to a close. The 1848 revolution, unsuc-
cessful as it was in many respects, demanded political action and
swept away much of the contemplative, classicist attitude on which
Savigny's theory rested.'" This change in climate manifested itself
in the Germanist legal scholars' attack on the dominance of Roman
law and in their call for legal and political reform.'" Finally, the
growing power of the bourgeoisie, .a result of increasing commerce
and industrialization, made it less acceptable to rely only on the
slow organic development of the law. There was an immediate need
for dynamic reform, and the historical theory of law, strictly ex-
cluding the search for legal innovation from the realm of legal
science, began to look out of date.
In the early 1850s, there was a growing consensus among the
Romanists that it was time for legal science to leave the past behind
and to build a modern, practically useful system of law.'" Concep-
tual jurisprudence provided the method. To be sure, the more
practically minded jurists probably looked upon Puchta's and Jher-
ing's veneration of abstract logic with suspicion. But even they must
have been tempted by the great, and indeed very practical, promise
of the conceptual method. If all the basic elements of law could be
distilled from the given rules, it was possible to "economize the
material" of the law.'" Its hitherto confusing mass under the weight
of which all lawyers groaned could be reduced to its fundamental
principles. The law would be vastly more intelligible and manage-
able. Furthermore, as a logical system containing all fundamental
principles, legal science could achieve gaplessness and completeness.
This would make legal reasoning comfortably predictable and in-
dependent from considerations from outside of the system.'° 7 And
finally, the conceptual method could even create new law out of the
system itself.'"
1" Savigny, who had given up his chair at the University of Berlin upon his appointment
as Minister of Justice by the Prussian king in 1842 and who in 1847 had become . the President
of the Prussian Council of Ministers, resigned with his fellow ministers in the course of the
1848 revolution.
1" See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
G5 See STINTZING/LANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 743-50,
10e 
"[Mit dem] Material zu ökonomisiren." R. VON JHERING, 2 GEIST DES RermiscHey
RECHTS 322 (7th ed. 1907); see also JHERING, GEIST 1, supra note 93, at 91.
1 °7 See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
108 See infra notes 169-72 and accompanying text.
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The fulfillment of these promises of economy, gaplessness, and
self-reproduction was the agenda of legal science of the second half
of the nineteenth century. By applying Puchta's and Jhering's con-
ceptual method'" to the "Pandects," i.e., that part of Justinian's
Digest that contained most of the classical Roman law, the Romanists
created the "Pandektenwissenschaft." From the Pandects they dis-
tilled the leading concepts—person, property, obligation, contract,
delict, succession, etc.—and used them to build a modern and prac-
tically useful system of law. In his doctrinal work, Jhering was
himself one of the leading representatives of this school and devel-
oped some of the most important doctrines of modern civil law."°
The harvest of the Pandektenwissenschaft was rich. Its great
systems of private law were developed in teaching and writing.
Adolf von Vangerow"' artfully displayed the Pandectist system in
his lectures at the University of Heidelberg in the 1860s. Hundreds
of students, many from abroad, listened to von Vangerow whose
fame as a teacher went beyond Germany. His Treatise on the Pandects
embodied his teaching and was one of the leading authorities of its
time." 2
It was soon eclipsed, however, by Bernhard Windscheid's Trea-
tise on the Law of the Pandects."s Windscheid, Vangerow's successor
in Heidelberg and a lifelong friend of Jhering, was the most im-
portant and most widely known Pandectist." 4 His work was widely
recognized as the ultimate achievement of the Pandektenwissen-
schaft and rightly praised for its combination of clarity of leading
concepts with a sense for balanced solutions. Windscheid presented
the private law of his time in all its complexity, and yet with great
clarity as an internally logical order. Every concept and every rule
had its place in a carefully designed, strictly hierarchical and gapless
system." More than any other work, it seemed to prove that con-
mg Albeit mostly without its naturalist terminology.
"° The most impressive demonstration of Jhering's ability to extricate new doctrines
from the classical Roman law was the development of the concept of the culpa in cantralundo,
i.e. the principle that even before the conclusion of a contract the contracting parties owe to
each other a duty of care. See R. vox JHERING, CUipa in Confrahendo, 4 JAHRBOCHER FOR DIE
DOGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN RaMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 1 (1861).
"' On Vangerow see KLEINHEYER/SCHRODER, supra note 22, at 354.
112 K. A. VON VANGEROW, LEHRBUCH DER PANDEKTEN (3 vols. 1863-69).
" 5
 B. WINDSGHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS (3 vols. 1862-70).
114 On Windscheid see KLEINHEYERYSCHRODER, supra note 22, at 301-04; STirrziNo/
LANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 854-65; E. WOLF, supra note 47, at 591-621.
115 See the praise of Windscheid's work in STINTZING/LANDSBERG 111,2 (1910), supra note
22, at 859-60.
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ceptual jurisprudence made it possible to master the mass of the
legal material through a scientific system. It unified and streamlined
the otherwise diverse and chaotic positive law. Because of these
qualities, Windscheid's treatise almost enjoyed the authority of a
code in the late nineteenth century, not only among scholars but
also in the courts. Like Vangerow's lectures, Windscheid's Lehrbuch
was famous beyond German borders.
But the Pandektenwissenschaft also suffered from serious
weaknesses. The influence of Puchta's and Jhering's conceptual
method made it highly artificial. The concepts on which it rested
were abstract entities, distilled from actual legal rules, but also de-
tached from reality. From these abstract concepts it logically de-
duced legal rules to arrive at a system that was presented as the
incarnation of timeless legal truth. But in the beauty of its logic, it
paid scant attention to the realities of late nineteenth century Ger-
man society. It knew only of contract, delict and property, but
nothing of labor conflict, railroad accidents, and unsanitary housing
conditions." 6
The last fruit of the systematic Romanist legal science was the
German Civil Code, drafted from 1874 to 1896, and enacted in
1900. 117 Windscheid himself was a member of the first drafting
commission. To be sure, the authors drew not only on the work of
the Romanists but also on indigenous German law. But in all other
respects the Code was a child of the Pandektenwissenschaft. Its
structure was that of the great Pandectist treatises. So much of the
material used stemmed from Windscheid's Lehrbuch that the Code
has frequently been called "a Windscheid Pandect treatise in sta-
tutory form."" 8 And the method on which it rested, a system of
leading concepts interconnected through logical operations, was the
hallmark of conceptualism. As a result, it embodied the ideals of
the Pandektenwissenschaft in its conceptual precision, systematic
coherence, and logical consistency, but it also demonstrated the
flaws of abstractness and disregard of the needs of a modern in-
dustrialized society." 9
"6 For an American critique of Windscheid's work, see Smith, Four German Jurists, 12
Pot- Sm. Q. 59 (1897).
II/ See F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 468-86. For a contemporary account in English,
see Freund, The Proposed German Civil Code, 24 AM. L.R. 237 (1890), and Freund, The New
German Civil Code, 13 1-{ARV. L. REV. 627 (1899).
" 6 "[E]in in Gesetzesparagraphen gebrachtes Windscheidsches Pandektenlehrbuch."
KLEINHEYERISCIIRelDER, supra note 22, at 301.
,12 For the background of the Code and its enactment, see M. JOHN, POLITICS AND THE
LAW IN LATE 19TH CENTURY GERMANY—THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL CODE (1989).
868	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 31:837
It was in part for these reasons that the other major branch of
the historical school—the Germanists—considered the Roman law,
which in their opinion invited such an approach, an inappropriate
foundation for modern jurisprudence. Furthermore, Roman law
was, despite the reception of much of its substance and methods
during the Renaissance, the product of an alien and ancient culture.
The needs of the present, however, demanded a modern system of
law for Germany. From that perspective it made more sense to base
such a system on indigenous German law that had its own, inde-
pendent roots in the middle ages. It was to this tradition that the
Germanists, the main competitors of the Pandektenwissenschaft,
turned. 12°
Studies in German law had been part of the historical school
from its very beginning. For the first two decades of the century,
Romanists and Germanists had coexisted peacefully and considered
themselves both adherents of the same historical jurisprudence. The
"Zeitschrift far geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft" as its organ was
founded in 1816 by both Savigny and Karl Friedrich Eichhorn, the
most prominent scholar of German law at the time. 12 ' A deep
personal friendship connected Savigny with Jakob Grimm, another
leading Germanist. Minor differences aside, the Germanists sub-
scribed to Savigny's original idea of a new, historical as well as
systematic, science of positive law. The only major difference con-
cerned the material they studied.
But this harmony did not last. At the root of the conflict to
come lay one fundamental disagreement. Most Germanists took the
idea of law as custom of the people seriously in a traditional, popular
sense, while Savigny and his disciples -understood it in their own
peculiar, elitist way.' 22 This caused friction in several respects. The
Germanists believed that if the law was an expression of the Volks-
geist, the German, rather than Roman, sources should of course be
the main object of German legal science. Thus, Savigny's continued
exaltation of Roman law alienated many Germanists. Moreover, if
law was the custom of the people, it should, at least to some extent,
be administered by the people. Many Germanists therefore enter-
tained romantic notions of lay justice and were hostile to Savigny's
II° For a more complete description of the Germanist branch of the historical school, see
STINTZING/LANDSKERC III. 2 (1910), supra note 22, at 495-560.
17 ' On Eichhorn see KLEINHEYERISCHRODER. supra note 22, at 72-75; STINTZING/LANDS-
BERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 253-77; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 403-04.
144 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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idea of the rulership of academically trained, scientific jurists. And
finally as custom, law would indeed evolve continuously. Conse-
quently, the Germanists as a group had more interest in the histor-
ical method than the Romanists, and correspondingly less interest
in building a system.'" As long as Savigny's towering authority held
the historical school together, these tensions were latent. Open con-
flict broke out, however, when Puchta abandoned all historical ef-
forts in favor of a system of exclusively Roman law, and particularly
when he argued that the law of the people counted little today while
the law of the jurists should dominate.
The conflict was essentially political. To some extent, it was the
clash of populist with elitist views of law. This clash became visible
in Georg Beseler's attack on Puchta.'" In his book People's Law and
Jurists' Law,' 25 Beseler denied the jurists' claim to leadership and
defended the right of lay people to develop their German law in
the traditional ways. Roman jurisprudence, full of intricacies that
no layperson could hope to penetrate, had estranged the law from
the people, and its reception was a "national disaster. "126 Julius
Hermann von Kirchmann launched similar attacks in his famous
speech On the Worthlessness of Jurisprudence as a Science in 1848. 127
Kirchmann argued that legal science was not only methodologically
pointless, 128 but actually highly harmful because its abstractness
destroyed the feeling for justice.' 29
 He expressed the widespread
anti-elitist sentiments poignantly: "The nation is tired of the scien-
tific jurists."'"
The Germanists also openly denounced Roman jurisprudence
as a tool of political oppression. In their national-romantic mood,
they saw Justinian's law as the regime of a despotic ruler, adopted
in Germany during the rise of absolutism by the princes and by the
learned jurists as their officials. This law had helped to destroy the
123 Cf. infra note 134 and accompanying text.
12' On Beseler see B.R. KERN, GEORG BESELER, LEBEN UND WERK (1982); KLEINHEVERi
SCHRODER, supra note 22, at 29-32; STorziNG/LANnsBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at
507-19; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20 at 408-10.
'" G. BESELER, VOLKSRECHT UND JURISTENRECHT (1843).
E26" Nationalungltick, " Id. at 42.
1" J. H. VON KIRCHMANN, DIE WERTHLOSICHEIT DER JURISPRDDENZ ALS WISSENSCHAFT
(Meyer-Tscheppe ed. 1988) (1848). Von Kirchmann is generally not considered a "German-
ise' himself, but the views expressed in his pamphlet are closely related to those of the more
romantic Germanists.
128 See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
129 1 VON KIRCHMANN, supra note 127, at 39-41.
130 "Die Nation ist der wissenschaftlichen Juristen uberdrussig." Id. at 45.
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traditional rights and freedoms that the German people had en-
joyed during the middle ages."' The Germanists' research in me-
dieval law was an attempt to revive this tradition. It is thus not
surprising that the 1848 revolution saw the Romanists and the
Germanists on opposite sides—Savigny and his school closely allied
with the Prussian crown, Beseler and the Germanists among the
fighters for a constitution and basic rights.
Jurisprudentially, in contrast, many Germanists continued to
share the Romanists' methods and goals. They saw nothing wrong
with legal science as such. They only wanted to apply it to the
German sources. A scientific treatment of these sources should
prove that German law contained its own fundamental principles
and logical order. Thus, German law was not only politically pref-
erable but also intellectually equal to the Roman law. Already Ei-
chhorn, the co-founder of the historical school, had worked in this
spirit earlier in the century. In the 1840s, when Savigny wrote his
System of Modern Roman Law, the systematic method became'increas-
ingly popular among the Germanists as well, and Beseler himself
published a system of common German private law.' 32 Some Ger-
manists even followed Puchta's conceptual path. When Puchta's
disciple, the Germanist Karl Friedrich Wilhelm Gerber joined Jher-
ing as the editor of the new Yearbooks for the Dogmatics of Modern
Roman and German Private Law, 133 the Germanists united once more
with the Romanists, now under the banner of conceptualism. Since
the middle of the century, Gerber and others competed with the
Pandectists in designing a logical order of concepts.'" They hoped
to convince their contemporaries that it was not necessary for legal
science to resort to alien sources in order to create a modern legal
system.
Despite these ambitions, the Germanists' endeavours did not
end the Romanist predominance in legal academia and practice.
The Germanists, however, generated important contributions to
legal doctrine. Particularly in areas not covered by the classical
I" In particular, it had replaced oral procedure in open court before lay judges with a
clandestine, written procedure before an inquisitorial official. The Germanists' demand for
a return to trial by jury aimed at the protection of the individual from the state authorities,
represented by the Romanist jurists and their despotic law. See F. WIEACKER, supra note 20,
at 409-12.
IM G. BESELER, SYSTEM DES GEMEINEN DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS (3 vols. 1847-55).
in JAHRBOCHER Fült DIE DOCMATIK DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN PRIVA-
TRECHTS (K. Gerber & R. von jlhering eds. 1857).
"4 See K.F.W. GERBER, SYSTEM DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATFtECHTS (2 parts, 1848-49).
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Roman sources, such as commercial enterprises, corporations, in-
surance, and admiralty, the Germanists established whole fields of
law, much of which later entered the Civil and the Commercial
Codes.'" "Rechtswissenschaft" also showed impressive results when
applied to the tradition of indigenous German law.
These results were much admired in the common law orbit as
well. For many Anglo-American scholars, the most impressive dem-
onstration of the power of a Germanist legal science was Otto von
Gierke's' 36
 magisterial treatise The German Law of Association)"
Gierke traced the idea of an association through German history,
presenting it as one of the fundamental institutions of German
private law. In his work, historical research was directly employed
for the establishment and characterization of an essential legal con-
cept from which modern rules and principles could be derived.
Gierke's work also contained a political element. He considered the
association an expression of the collectivist character of German law
in contrast to the rampant individualism of the Roman law, and
indeed as an antidote to it. When Romanist individualism turned
out to pervade the draft of the Civil Code, Gierke became one of
its most ardent and influential critics.'" In the end, Gierke and his
fellow Germanists prevented a purely Romanist codification and
preserved the tradition of indigenous German law throughout the
nineteenth century, and for the twentieth century.
B. The Historical Dimension: Roman and German Legal History
With all their energies invested in the pursuit of Savigny's
ultimate goal of a scientific order of law, Romanist as well as Ger-
manist conceptual jurists gradually forgot the other half of Savigny's
original theory—the historical character of law. Not only did they
neglect historical studies, they also presented their systems as con-
structions of timeless logic. But the historical heritage of Savigny
lived on in the work of a different group of scholars who focused
on the facts of the past rather than on the theories of the present.
1" See ALLGEMEINES DEUTSCHES HANDELSGESETZBUCH of 1861 (Deutscher Bund); HAN-
DELSGESETZBUCH 1897, in force 1900 (Deutsches Reich).
1" On Gierke Set KLEINFIEVEFt/SCEIRODER, supra note 22, at 93-98; STINTZING/LANDSIIERG
111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 912-16; E. WOLF, supra note 47, at 669-712.
1" 0. VON GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHE GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT (4 vols., 1868-1913).
1" 0. VON GIERKE, DER ENTWURF EINES BORGERL/CHEN GESEZBUCIIES UND DAS DEUTSCHE
RECHT (1889). There were also various socialist critiques of the civil code, the most important
of which is A. MENGER, DAS BORGERLICHE RECUT UND DIE BESITZLOSEN VOLKSKLASSEN (1890).
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The meaning of historical studies, however, had changed sig-
nificantly since the early days of the historical school. For Savigny,
legal science had been historical in nature, but not an exercise in
legal history. Historical research had been only a tool to reveal the
innermost and fundamental ideas of law as the bases for the system
then to be built. But when the bulk of this work had been done
around the middle of the century, historical studies could gradually
free themselves from this subordinate function. The systems of
modern law were then in place, and it became possible to look at
history solely for the sake of knowledge about the past. Legal history
in its own right was born when it was no longer directly necessary
for practical purposes. As a result, the purely historical branches of
German legal science made comparatively few contributions to legal
practice.
But the generation of legal historians after Savigny no longer
considered such contributions its foremost task. Whether they were
Romanists or Germanists, they saw themselves more as historians
who specialized in law than as lawyers with an interest in history.•
Professionally, they were closer to Ranke and Burckhard than to
Puchta and Windscheid. Their scholarship was a major branch of
the historical science that had flourished in Germany since the early
decades of the century and that was recognized worldwide in its
second half. The legal historians benefited from, and contributed
to, this reputation.
As befit true scientists, the legal historians emphasized the es-
tablishment and interpretation of factual truth. Accordingly, they
worked predominantly in two fields. They gathered and edited
original sources, and they wrote comprehensive treatises on legal
history.
On the Romanist side, Savigny himself had already begun to
explore the stock of original manuscripts when he had spent years
hunting for them in the European libraries. But his contemporary
Barthold Georg Niebuhr made the most important find. Niebuhr
was a kindred spirit of Savigny in his classicist attitude, his conser-
vative bent, and his later career as a statesman for the Prussian
crown. Following Savigny's intuition, he discovered an almost com-
plete manuscript of Gaius' Institutes in a library in Verona in 1816.
The palimpsest was not only a full copy of one of the most important
classical Roman texts of which little had been known, it was also the
first and only text originating directly from the classical period. The
writings of other classical jurists were preserved only in the form
of excerpts in the sixth century compilation of Justinian's Digest.
Niebuhr and Savigny cooperated in the edition of the text. Two
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years after Savigny had founded the historical school and called for
a return to the original sources, his program had already borne
more fruit than anybody could have hoped for.
Niebuhr's discovery boosted the reputation of the Romanist
historical school enormously at home as well as 'abroad. And it
encouraged the Romanist historians to persist in their efforts to
print reliable editions of original sources. Particularly later in the
century, the scholars combined historical research with advanced
philological methods. This combination bore rich fruit of which
Theodor Mommsen's ' 3° critical edition of the Digest and Otto Le-
nel's edition of the Edictum Perpetuum"° are the most noteworthy
examples.
Where a reliable factual record had been established on the
basis of the original sources, the writing of scientific historical trea-
tises became possible. Niebuhr gave an impressive early example
with his Roman History. 141 The book was complex and inaccessible,
but it showed that an accurate description of the past was possible
through careful attention to hard data, that is, through a truly
scientific approach. Two generations later, Mommsen's Roman Con-
stitutional Law demonstrated that German Romanist historiography
had reached a level of sophistication unsurpassed anywhere in the
world.' 42
For the Germanist legal historians, philological research was
even more important than for their Romanist colleagues. Lacking
the advantage of a single, authoritative source such as the Corpus
Juris, they were in dire need of reliable editions of the original texts
of German legal history. Already in 1819, Karl Freiherr vom Stein
launched the Monumenta Germaniae Historica, a project to collect
sources of German legal history. Among the first sources printed
were the Germanic tribal laws from the early middle ages. Savigny's
disciple and friend Jakob Grimm 143 published his Germanic Ancient
Legal Elements' 44 and his "Weisthfimer." 45 In their footsteps, Ger-
manists continued to print collections of historical texts.
122 DIGESTA IUSTINIANI AUGUSTI I, 11 (1868-1870). On Mommsen see F. WIEACKER, supra
note 20, at 417-19. In contrast to Niebuhr, Mommsen was a lawyer by training.
14° 0. LENEL, DAS EDICTUM PERPETUUM (1883).
Hi B.G. NIEBUHR, ROMISGHE GESCHICHTE (3 vols. 1828-32).
142 T. MOMMSEN, ROMISCHES STAATSRECHT (1887).
143 On Grimm see KLEINHEYER/ScnaCiDER, supra note 22, at 105-07; STINTZING/LANUS-
BERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 277-86; F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 405-06; F.
WIEACKER, GRONDER UND BEWAHRER 144-61 (1959).
144T. GRIMM,
 Ta 	 DEUTSCHE REGHTSALTERTOMER (1828).
' 4 ' J. GiuMM, WEISTHOMER (4 vols. 1840-63).
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These critical editions became the bases for the Germanists'
scientific historical studies. Scrutinizing the original texts, but also
drawing on archeological discoveries, they began to replace specu-
lation about historical facts with their ascertainment. Scholars like
Amira, Gierke, Hensler, Maurer, and Sohm established in their
treatises new knowledge about Germanic and medieval legal insti-
tutions."6
 Their scholarship even broke new ground in some areas
of English legal history. Brunner's work on the origins of the jury' 47
or Nasse's study of early agricultural communities 148 were praised
and emulated by common law historians. 149 Like their Romanist
colleagues, the Germanist legal historians set the standards for sci-
entific historiography on an international scale.
All of these branches of scholarship—the Pandektenwissen-
schaft, the systematic science of modern German law, Ronian and
German legal history—were part of the historical school as the
mainstream of German legal science in the nineteenth century. In
reality, the diversity of the picture was even greater than here
presented because each of these branches consisted of many indi-
vidual scholars with different styles and particular interests. In ad-
dition, many works fit several categories at the same time, like
Gierke's historical as well as systematic scholarship, while others fit
none of these categories at all, like the programmatic writings of
Savigny, Thibaut, Beseler, or von Kirchmann.
And yet, tracing their development from the turn of the eigh-
teenth to the nineteenth century has shown that these branches of
scholarship were not entirely separate and independent phenom-
ena. They were connected through a common core of underlying
ideas around which all of them revolved. This common core was
the concept of legal science itself.
III. THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL SCIENCE
At first glance, the concept of legal science was elusive. There
was no generally accepted standard definition, and its meaning kept
changing throughout the nineteenth century. Modern German legal
146 See STINTZ1NG/LANDSBERG 111.2 (1910), supra note 22, at 495-561.
"7 0. BRUNNER, DIE EP.ITSTEHUNG DER SCHWURGERICHTE (1871); See also F. LIEBERMANN,
DIE GESETZE DER ANCELSACHSEN (3 vols. 1903-16); F. LIEBERMANN, UBER DAS ENGLISCHE
RECHTSBUCH LEGES HENRICI (1901); F. LIEBERMANN, UBER DIE LEGES ANGLORUM SAECULO
XIII (1894); F. LIEBERMANN, UBER DIE LEGES EDVARD1 CONFESSORIS (1896).
118 E. NASSE, AGRICULTURAL COMMUNITIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (H.A. Ouvry transl.
1871).
' 49 See Adams, Book Review 114 N. AM. REV. 196 (1872); Pollock, In Memoriam Frederic
William Maitland, 23 L. Q. R. 137 (1907) (praising Brunner).
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historians and theorists have therefore by and large refrained from
attempts to isolate a uniform concept of legal science for Savigny
and the generations of his successors. Instead they have character-
ized legal science differently for the various phases of nineteenth
century jurisprudence. 15°
But in the generations after Savigny, German jurists themselves
talked and wrote about "Rechtswissenschaft" as if there was really
one, shared concept of it. It is unlikely that they used this term
indiscriminately for whatever approach they currently had in mind.
In contrast to their Anglo-American brethren, they were all trained
in German jurisprudence and were especially familiar with Savigny's
original historical theory of law. Of course, "Rechtswissenschaft"
did not always mean exactly the same thing to all scholars at all
times. But the common and persistent use of the term reflects that
they shared a set of basic ideas. Indeed, the fact that virtually all of
them subscribed to "Rechtswissenschaft" in one form or another
was perhaps the most important factor that united them as an
academic culture despite all personal rivalries, political disagree-
ments, and jurisprudential disputes.' 5 '
This shared, basic concept of legal science consisted of several
interacting notions. As a result, the meaning of "Rechtswissen-
schaft" had many dimensions and was complex, but it was not
therefore unspecific or vague. Because it had its roots in Savigny's
historical theory of law, it is best approached from the perspective
of his ideas. These fundamental ideas were the notions of law as a
product of history ("Geschichte"), of law as a system ("System"), and
of the combination of both these notions in a science of positive
law. All major versions of jurisprudence after Savigny and until
jhering were variations on these basic themes. In order to under-
stand the concept of "Rechtswissenschaft," one must therefore first
grasp the meaning of "Geschichte" and "System," and then under-
stand their interaction.
A. The Elements of "Rechtswissenschaft": Analysis of "Geschichte" and
"System"
Savigny's original conceptions of "Geschichte" and "System"
were themselves not monolithic. Instead, they already had a variety
15° See, e.g„ K. LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHA}T 11-38 (5th ed. 1983);
F. W1EACKER, supra note 20, at 348-513.
15 ' A notable exception was von Kirchmann. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying
text. Thibaut also questioned the blessings of legal science. A.F.J. THIBAUT, supra note 56, at
72-73.
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of dimensions. Savigny's successors used each of these dimensions
as a basis for further developments.
In Savigny's notion of law as a product of "Geschichte," at least
three intertwined but different elements can be isolated. They all
express, in one form or another, Savigny's deeply felt conviction
that law was a cultural phenomenon. Therefore, they were all re-
actions against the old natural law jurisprudence, the most elemen-
tary flaw of which had been its blindness to this fundamental truth.
First, the historical character of law simply meant that law as a
cultural phenomenon was subject to change over time, and that the
present was the product of history.' 52 This can be called the plainly
"historicist element" of Savigny's idea. It was not Savigny's insight
but had already been emphasized by Vico, Montesquieu, Hugo and
others. Here Savigny was reacting against the ahistorical rationalism
of the natural law age and its belief that law could be created purely
by means of reason. This historicism was part of the general rise of
history as the "regina scientiarum" during the nineteenth century.
The historical bent of the age fostered classicist attitudes of which
Savigny's enthusiasm for Roman law was an example, and a roman-
tic mood as expressed by the Germanists' love for an idyllic medieval
past.
The veneration of history had normative potential. Savigny did
not advocate a simple return to the past, nor did he ever maintain
that legal rules and institutions became better with age. In fact,
according to his theory, much of the old legal materials had to be
discarded because they were not part of the organic growth of the
law. But because present law had its roots in history, present juris-
prudence had to use the past as its reference point. It was only a
small step then, to consider the past a model for the present, at
least in the form of a recommendation. Among the historical jurists,
there was no agreement as to which part of the past to look to, the
classical Roman period or the medieval Germanic tradition. But for
the early Romanists as well as the Germanists, history not only
inevitably determined the present, but also provided arguments to
shape it 'in a particular way.
This "historicist" view of law had practical implications for the
goals of legal science. Because law was a product of history, it was
senseless to try to create it through reason by an act of will. Thus
codification, as exemplified by the Prussian, French and Austrian
152 von Savigny, Ober den Zweck dieser Zeilschrift, ZEITSCHIFT FUR GESCHICHTLICHE RECHT-
SWISSENSCHAFT 1-5 (1815).
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codes, was a folly. In order to understand the law, it was necessary
to pay more attention to its historical background and to the legal
tradition of the culture.
Much of German legal thought developed out of this first,
rather simple and unoriginal, historicist element. In general, the
result was a heightened awareness of the law's historical dimension
and a renewed belief in the necessity and dignity of historical stud-
ies. In particular, legal history as a discipline in its own right was
established later in the century, fully devoting itself to the explo-
ration of legal traditions.
Second, the law was not only subject to change, it was also the
result of evolution. This can be called the organicist element in
Savigny's notion of "Geschichte." Here, Savigny absorbed, con-
sciously or unconsciously, Lamarck's early ideas of evolution, which
were much discussed in his day.'" To be sure, this form of evolu-
tionism was not empirical, that is, it was not based on concrete
observation. It was an idealistic belief in the gradual unfolding of
ideas. In other words, it was more Hegelian than Darwinian.' 54
While also a reaction against the rationalism of the eighteenth
century, this organicism was more specifically a protest against the
arbitrary disruptions of the historical process in the previous age,
be it the abrogation of old law through codification or the abolition
of the traditional social structures through the French Revolution.
In an age threatened by rapid social, political, and intellectual
change, it expressed a yearning for continuity that was shared by
many contemporaries in Germany and abroad. In this respect, Sa-
vigny's jurisprudence fit particularly well with the strongly conser-
vative mood of the German aristocracy after the Napoleonic wars.
And Savigny, himself a nobleman who loathed and feared radical
innovation,'" became a symbol for the preservation of traditional
structures.
This "organicist element" was indispensable for a science of
positive law to be possible at all, for an epistemological and a prac-
tical reason. Epistemologically, it was needed because science was
seeking to recognize the internal order in the external facts. It was
therefore looking for the regularities in their relationship with each
other. After the view of the world as a mechanical universe had
1 " See J. STERN, THIBAUT UND SAVIGNY 25 (1914).
'" See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
'"See F. WIEACHER, GRONDER UND BEWAHRER 119-21 (1959); E. WOLF, supra note 47,
at 507.
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been abandoned, it was primarily the organicist element that justi-
fied the hope that such regularities indeed existed. Organic growth
of law promised ordered development according to principles that
science could perceive, instead of erratic change of rules before
which it had to capitulate. Practically, the belief that the growth of
law followed organic principles made it possible to fill gaps in the
knowledge of the past. Understanding these principles and thus the
patterns underlying legal development, the scientist could hope to
extrapolate yet unknown facts from those already established. Thus,
the inevitable incompleteness of the historical record was no serious
obstacle because once the scientist knew enough from the sources
to perceive the organic principles, logical conclusion could supple-
ment the remainder. 156
This organicism was the predominant theoretical reason for
the historical school's hostility towards legislative lawmaking.'" If
the law grew organically, then such growth must not be disturbed
or arrested. Legislation, however, always threatened to do one or
the other, or both. Where it was innovative, changing existing rules,
it was likely to deviate from the organic development. It thus vio-
lated the higher laws governing the growth of the law, and caused
a disturbance that must be avoided. It was an exercise of human
volition, but organic growth left no room for conscious choice. Even
where legislation avoided innovation and contained only well-estab-
lished rules, it was potentially harmful because it cast those rules
into hard statutory form that tended to impede further growth.
Progressive codification like the French civil code combined both
evils and became anathema.
Later branches of German legal science developed out of this
"organicist element" by understanding it in a biological way. For
Savigny, the idea of law as a product of organic growth was pri-
marily a cultural notion. But already Puchta considered legal con-
cepts "living beings." Later on, Jhering and others described legal
concepts as live, procreating organisms. Here, organicism led to
notions of a "biology of law." 158 Of course, these terms were used
only metaphorically. But when evolutionism became fashionable
later in the century, law could be seen as just as much an evolution-
156 Here, Savigny's ideas were closely related to Niebuhr's. See F. SCHNABEL, 5 DEUTSCHE
GESCHICHTE CM 19. JAHRHUNDEAT 56 (1965).
157
	 SAVICNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at 105-08, 126.
' 5'1E. KUNTZE, DER WENDEPUNKT DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 90 (1856) ("Biologie des
Rechts").
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ary phenomenon as life itself, and legal science could be considered
equal to the natural sciences. Savigny's organicism allowed his dis-
ciples to see Darwin as a kindred spirit. They could boost their
confidence in the accomplishments of their discipline by likening
them to the pathbreaking discoveries published in The Origin of
Species.
Third, to look at law as a historical phenomenon meant to
• consider its positive, as opposed to its metaphysical, side. This can
be called the "positivist element" in Savigny's historical theory. Here,
"history" did not refer to tradition, but to legal facts. Facts are by
their very nature "historical" in the sense that all data are: as some-
thing that is already given and thus already part of the past. Already
in his early work, Savigny had pointed out that 141 knowledge of
objective data is called historical knowledge, thus the whole char-
acter of legal science must be historical . . . ."' 59 This notion was a
reaction against the metaphysical (i.e. fact-independent and thus
ahistorical) speculation of the age of reason and was tied into the
rise of positivist science in the nineteenth century. In an age that
was increasingly turning away from speculation and towards facts,
history had to succeed philosophy as the queen of the humanities,
and jurisprudence had to become historical as well.
The methodological implication of this "positivist element" was
that philosophy was no longer considered a necessary part of juris-
prudence. Savigny was convinced that even "as merely preliminary
knowledge, philosophy is not at all necessary for the jurist." 160 Its
speculative or normative potential promised no help in performing
the essential task of the legal scientist, the understanding and sys-
tematization of positive law.
"Positive law" now had a new meaning. For the natural lawyers,
the metaphysical side of law was immutable, while its "positive" side
(the law of the actual lawgiver) was by its very nature arbitrary. For
Savigny, and the historical school, it was the other way around.
159 SAVIGNY, METHODENLEHRE, SUpra note 61, at 14. "Alles Wissen von einem objcktiv
Gegebenen nenut man historisches Wissen, folglich mul3 der gesamte Character der Gesetz-
gebungswissenschaft historisch sein." Id.
IL Id. at 50. "[Aber] auch als blof3e Vorkenntnis ist die Philosophic dem Juristen durchaus
nicht notwendig." Id. Savigny must not be misunderstood to have looked down upon philos-
ophy. Quite to the contrary, he took it so seriously that he found jurists as dilettante philos-
ophers unbearable. "Who does not feel driven to philosophy, should leave it alone. Its study
requires not only half a year, but a whole life" ("Wer nicht zur Philosophic getricben wird,
der lasse sic liegen. Ihr Studium erfordert nicht blo8 ein halbes Jahr, sondern ein gauzes
Leben."). Id. In contrast to the natural lawyers, Savigny saw philosophy and legal science as
independent disciplines that required different approaches and skills.
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Metaphysical jurisprudence was mere speculation and thus arbi-
trary, while the "positive" law actually found in history was, at least
in its relevant parts, the expression of the spirit of the people and
thus historically necessary. "Positive" now meant existing, not arbi-
trarily made. Since true science must deal with historically existing
facts (be they the facts of nature or the data of positive law), not
with human arbitrariness, it had to be positivist and thus historical.
In this sense, a science of positive law, and a historical science of
law were the same.
This "positivist element" pervaded nineteenth century German
legal science.' 6 ' Conceptualist jurisprudence under Puchta and
Jhering, the Pandectists, and even most of the Germanists strictly
adhered to the program of a science of positive law. Where they
abdicated on historical research, their method became ahistorical in
the sense that they disregarded the historical background of law,
but it remained "historical" in the sense of positivist. This explains
how German legal science, even after the demise of Savigny's orig-
inal program around the middle of the century, could still be con-
sidered "historical" by many scholars in Germany and abroad.
The "historical" characteristic of German legal science could
thus have very different meanings. It could signify a more or less
classicist or romantic veneration of the past, a belief in the organic
nature of historical development, or it could constitute the postulate
for a positivist form of science.
The goal of all historical work, however, was the scientific order
of law, the "System." Because for Savigny law was only the invisible
line that limited private spheres of freedom,' 62 the system presented
the overall network of these lines. Its substance was therefore the
logically coordinated totality of private entitlements. This network
had, like Savigny's notion of "Geschichte," several characteristics on
which his followers could build. There are, again, at least three
dimensions.
First, the system was the inherent order of positive law. This
meant that it was to be vastly different in character from its natural
law predecessors. Wolff's system had been an artificial creation of
an external order superimposed on law. Based on speculative rea-
soning, it was subjective and thus unscientific. Savigny's system was
the organic recreation of the internal order already contained in
lot See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
I" See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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law. Based on positive, historical material, it was objective and thus
truly scientific.
The idea of such an internal order became one of the pillars
of "Rechtswissenschaft." The German jurists claimed not to create
the system, but to bring to light a hitherto invisible coherence of
the principles. Even when in Puchta's or Jhering's systems every-
thing was logic and nothing experience, this logic was considered
to be already inherent in the law, only awaiting discovery.
Second, the system was perfect and complete. This was not
accomplished through detail: that would have been well-nigh im-
possible. But Savigny pointed out that
there is certainly a perfection of a different kind, which
may be illustrated by a technical expression of geometry.
In every triangle, namely, there are certain data from the
relations of which all the rest are necessarily deducible:
thus given two sides and the included angle, the whole
triangle is given. In like manner, every part of our law
has points by which the rest may be given: these may be
termed the leading axioms.'"
The scientific system would thus be gapless in the sense of contain-
ing the building blocks needed to deduce the rules not already
spelled out. Jhering explained it in terms of chemistry when he
wrote that legal science could provide
the simple reagents for the infinitely complicated concrete
cases in life. Whoever wanted to decide those only through
legal rules, would be at a loss forever, because the potential
for combinations in life is so inexhaustible that even the
richest casuistry of a code would seem inadequate. With
those few reagents, however, we can solve every case.'"
l VocKriost, supra note 61, at 38-39. "Allein es giebt allerdings eine solche Volistan-
digkeit in anderer Art, wie sich durch einen Kunstausdruck der Geometric deutlich machen
Wk. In jedem Dreyeck namlich giebt es gewisse Bestimmungen, aus deren Verbindung
zugleich alle ilbrigen mit Nothwendigkeit folgen: durch diese, z.B. durch zwei Seiten and
den zwischenliegenden Winkel, ist das Dreyeck gegeben. Auf ahnliche Weise hat jeder Theil
unsres Rechts solche StOcke, wodurch die tibrigen gegeben sind: wir kOnnen sic die leitenden
Grundsatze nennen." SAV1GNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at 110.
164 R. JHERING, GE. ►s-r I, supra note 93, at 40-51. "[We einfachen Regenzien fir die
unendlich komplizierten konkreten Falk des Lebens. Wer letztere nur mit Rechtssatzen in
der Hand entscheiden wollte, wOrde in unaufhOrlicher Verlegenheit sein, denn die Kombi-
nationskunst des Lebens ist so unerschOpflich, da0 die reichste Kasuistik eines Gesetzbuches
ihren ewig neuen Fallen gegentiber dtirftig crscheinen wiirde. Vermoge jener wenigen
Reagenzien hingegen Risen wir jeden Fall auf." Id.
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The assumption of the perfection and inherent completeness of the
system became the basis for conceptual jurisprudence, Romanist
and Germanist alike. In its exaltation of the logic of the system,
most extreme in Jhering's natural-historical method, conceptualism
provided the methodological foundation and jurisprudential dogma
of the "Pandektenwissenschaft."
In this respect, the system reflected the heritage of the natural
law age. To be sure, Savigny, Puchta and Jhering insisted that their
system was internal and organic, instead of external and formal,
but it was undeniable that the idea of a logically perfect and com-
plete system as such came from the law of reason. The same is true
for the method of logical deduction within the system, though the
nineteenth century jurists refined it extensively. The Pandectists
even adopted the concrete structure of their "Pandektensystem"
from Wolff's disciples.' 65
The temptations of logical perfection and systematic complete-
ness were strong. The system promised to master the legal chaos
that prevailed in nineteenth century Germany where the modern
Roman law, highly complex and frequently uncertain in itself, co-
existed with a multitude of indigenous German institutions, the
legislation of several dozen principalities, and a bewildering mass
of local customs. Where the system was embodied in the Pandectist
treatises, they were followed like guides through a wilderness.
Third, the system was not static and sterile but flexible and
organic. Because it was built out of organically growing principles,
it partook of their evolutionary nature. According to Savigny, "one
must take the system as a whole and think of it as progressing, i.e.,
a history of the system of jurisprudence as a whole is what really
counts." 66
 The legal concepts that form it can arise, change, or
disappear, "independent from accident and individual
arbitrariness" 167
 and according to the "spirit and need of the
time."68
 The system even had the potential for producing new law
out of itself:
Through the scientific form of the material, however,
which strives to reveal and to perfect its internal unity,
165 See F. W1EACKER, Supra note 20, at 373.
166
 SAVIGNY, METHODENLEHRE, supra note 61, at 32. "Man mu13 das System im ganzen
nehmen und es sich als fortschreitend denken, d.h. als Geschichte des Systems der jurispru-
denz im ganzen, hierauf kommt alles an." Id.
167 SAVIGNY, SYSTEM I, supra note 61, at 17. "[U]nabhangig von Zufall oder individueller
Willkuhr." Id.
165 Id. at 18. "Sinn und Bechirfnis der Zeit." Id.
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new organic life comes into being which in turn affects
the material, so that also from science itself a new kind of
law creation irresistibly arises. 169
Here Savigny combined his organicism with his belief in the re-
sponsibility of legal science for the development of the law at ad-
vanced stages of civilization.
This productive aspect of the system was further developed by
Puchta, who assumed that new principles could be created through
the combination of old ones so that the system could not only be
perfected, as Savigny had said, but even expanded from within
itself.
I call it the genealogy of concepts which means that one
must not see this hierarchy as a mere arrangement of
definitions. Each of these concepts is a living being, not
only a dead instrument . . . . Each is an individuality,
distinct from the individuality of his progenitor.'"
From his naturalist perspective, Jhering asserted that legal science
could work like chemistry--with basic elements. This enabled the
legal scientists not only to analyze existing matter, but also to create
new compounds. And like biology, jurisprudence studied an "or-
ganism.""' Jhering saw procreative processes at work. "The con-
cepts are productive, they mate and conceive new ones." 172 In one
form or another, the system's productive power became the under-
lying creed for systematic German legal science.
For the legal scientists, this productive power had important
advantages. It promised deliverance from the necessity of undesir-
able legislative lawmaking. Where solutions to new problems were
already contained in the system or could at least be construed from
it, there was no need to go outside of legal science and to resort to
legislative acts of will. And where such acts of will could not be
prevented, the productive potential of the system could at least
169 Id. at 46-47. "Indessen entsteht durch die dem Stoff gegebene wissenschaftliche
Form, welche seine innewohnende Einheit zu enthiillen und zu vollenden strebt, ein neues
organisches Leben, welches bildend auf den Stoff selbst zuruckwirkt, so dab auch aus der
Wissenschaft als solcher eine neue Art der Rechtserzeugung unaufhaltsam hervorgeht." Id.
170 G.F. PUCHTA, CURSUS DER 1NSTITUTIONEN 101 (2nd ed. 1845). "Ich nenne dies eine
Genealogic der Begriffe, darin liegt, daB man diese Leiter nicht als ein blokes Schema von
Definitionen betrachten darf. Jeder dieser Begriffe ist ein lebendiges Wesen, nicht ein todtes
Werkzeug Jeder ist eine IndividualitAt, unterschieden von der Individualitat seines
Erzeugers." Id.
' 7 ' JHERINC, Gust I, supra note 93, at 26.
172 Id. at 40 ("Die Begriffe sind produktiv, sic paaren sich und zeugen neue.").
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safeguard against their arbitrariness. If the system even created new
answers through logical conclusions, there was really, at least in
theory, no room for choice or disagreement. The logic of the system
provided a reliable guide for all situations.
Thus, like "Geschichtlichkeit des Rechts," "wissenschaftliches
System" was an idea with various dimensions. It signified the order
inherent in the overall pattern of private rights, the logical perfec-
tion in the complete coherence of its principles, and the power of
scientific law to grow and procreate.
The various dimensions of "Geschichte" and "System" inter-
acted when Savigny postulated the combination of historical method
and systematic goal as the hallmark of a true science of law. The
concept of "Rechtswissenschaft" was therefore the product of the
all these ingredients. As such it was rich in perspectives but also
marked by internal tensions between several of its aspects.
B. The Gist of "Rechtswissenschaft": Synthesis of "Geschichte" and
"System"
The combination of "Geschichte" and "System" presented an
enormous methodological challenge because elements of "Ges-
chichte" conflicted with elements of "System." Savigny overcame
this conflict by recurring to another element, one that was shared
by both concepts and could thus reconcile them.
The deep conflict between "Geschichte" and "System" was one
between positivist method and systematic result. On one hand, the
method of jurisprudence had to be historical. In its positivist di-
mension, this meant that it had to refrain from speculation and
instead look to the positive law found in the actual historical sources.
On the other hand, its result had to be systematic. That meant that
it had to organize the positive material into an order according to
the internal logic of the material itself. This combination could
succeed only if the positive material indeed contained such a sys-
tematic order, albeit yet undetected. The problem was that there
were strong reasons to believe the contrary. These reasons were
theoretical as well as practical.
From a theoretical perspective, it was simply hard to see why
there should be an internal, logical system within positive law. Pos-
itive law consisted in large parts of acts of human volition, legislative
and judicial. Often this volition was not exercised logically. Instead
legal choices responded to changing needs, depending on the times
and circumstances, or simply expressed momentary personal pref-
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erences, biases, or moods. For some of Savigny's contemporaries,
this made positive law outright improper as an object for legal
science. Von Kirchmann vociferously lamented that "through pos-
itive law jurisprudence is turned from a priestess of truth to a maid
of the accidental, the error, the passion, the irrational. Instead of
the eternal and absolute, the accidental and flawed becomes her
object."'" Furthermore, legal science was pointless because positive
law could always overrule any result science accomplished. "Three
corrective words from the legislature," von Kirchmann exclaimed,
"and whole libraries become wastepaper." 14
The situation in the real world amply confirmed these doubts.
Positive law varied vastly over time and space. In the patchwork of
early nineteenth century German jurisdictions alone, legal tradi-
tions, statutes, codes, and judicial decisions conflicted everywhere.
A look at earlier times or to other countries suggested even more
that disorder reigned supreme and that an internal order of positive
law was an illusion. To make matters worse, the lawgiver frequently
arrogated to itself the power to overrule legal science and even to
forbid the judges to pay any attention to it. 175
The consequence seemed to be that the historical method of
looking at positive law, and the systematic goal of an internally
logical order, were fundamentally at odds. The jurist could have
one or the other—a positivist method ending in the recognition of
chaos, or a logical system built, independently from positive law, on
reason—but not both at the same time.
Still, the desire to have both has been strong in the history of
legal thought. Though perhaps not consciously recognized as such,
both elements are expressions of human needs. Particularly after
the disillusionment with metaphysical speculation, the need to look
at the actual historical facts was great. But the chaos they presented
was also frightening and triggered a strong longing for order. Thus,
when Savigny proceeded to face the historical facts and yet to find
1 " J. VON KIRCHMANN, DIE WERTHLOSICKEIT DER JURISPIAUDENZ ALS WISSENSCHAFT 27
(Meyer-Tscheppe ed. 1988) (1848). "Aus einer Priesterin der Wahrheit wird sic durch das
positive Gesetz zu einer Dienerin des Zufalls, des lrrtums, der Leidenschaft, des Unver-
standes. Statt des Ewigen, Absoluten, wird das Zufallige, Mangelhafte ihr Gegenstand." Id.
174 Id. at 29 ("drei berichtigende Worte des Gesetzgebers and ganze Bibliotheken werden
zu Makulatur").
175 See H. CONRAD, 2 DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 384-85 (1966). The Prussian General
Land Law (Allgemeines Landrecht) of 1794 was also skeptical towards the "opinions of the
learned jurists" ("Meinungen der Rechtslehrer"). Allgemeines Landrecht far die preuBischen
Staaten, Einleitung (Introduction) 1. art. 60; see also SAV1CNY, BERUF, supra note 61, at 148-
49.
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a system in them, he promised to satisfy both the need to look at
the real world, and the hope to find it in order.
Savigny offered a solution to the conflict between historical
method and systematic goal on both the theoretical, and the prac-
tical level. This made his legal science a powerful intellectual model,
the fascination of which few contemporaries escaped.
Theoretically, he solved the dilemma between history and sys-
tem on the basis of an all-encompassing organic view of the world.
Savigny admitted that the totality of historical material was indeed
chaotic. But he maintained that not all of it was worthy of scientific
treatment. The scientifically relevant material must be filtered out,
the rest discarded. The test for scientific relevancy was whether
certain material was an integral part of the organic whole, or
whether it was a disturbance—whether it was, as Savigny called it,
"necessary" or "arbitrary." In order to perform this test, the jurist
must understand the organic whole of law. This understanding
could be reached by studying the development of positive law over
time. According to the "strictly historical method," the legal scientist
must "trace all given material to its roots" and thus discover its
organic principle. 176 Legal evolution disclosed to the eyes of the
legal scientist the nature of the organic whole and thus enabled him
to decide which material is part of it, and which is foreign to it.
Thus, the jurist could distill the leading principles from the mass
of positive law. These leading principles, not the mass of rules, were
the concern of science.
In the totality of the leading principles there was, finally, an
inherent order. At the core of Savigny's historical theory of law lay
the conviction that the principles were all internally consistent be-
cause they were all part of the same organic whole of one true law
for the entire (cultural) nation.' 77 They were all part of the same
organic whole because they were all expressions of the same spirit
of the nation. This was because the legal principles reflected basic
patterns of the common legal consciousness. The scientific jurists
had only translated and condensed them into the logical form.' 78
Thus, the common root of all the principles in the Volksgeist en-
sured that they were all cut from the same cloth. They stemmed
from the same spirit, the spirit that determined the internal order
176 SAVIGNY, BEaur, supra note 61, at 166 neden gegebenen Stott bis zu seiner Wurzel
zu verfolgen").
177 See SAVIGNY, SYSTEM 1, supra note 61, at 9-10.
' 78 See id. at 14, 16, 46.
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of the scientific system. In this manner, Savigny solved the conflict
between the positivist nature of the historical method and the logical
demands of the system by reconciling them through the underlying
element that both "Geschichte" and "System" shared: the organi-
cism resulting from the Volksgeist.
This approach was intentionally selective. Savigny's organicism
required that the factor responsible for disturbance and chaos—the
erratic nature of human volition—be eliminated. Savigny attempted
that by declaring the will of the individual lawmaker (legislator,
judge, or scholar) irrelevant. Of course, such an individual could
create rules in blatant violation of the fundamental principles. But
those arbitrary rules were just disturbances, not part of the organic
process and would thus be weeded out by legal science. They could
never threaten the scientific system because they could never be
admitted to it.
As a whole, Savigny's reconciliation of history and system
smacked of tautology: there is order in positive law, but only that
part of positive law counts that does not disturb the order. His
solution, however, may also be viewed as the expression of a so-
phisticated view of law and legal science. The totality of existing
rules consists in part of manifestations of basic cultural traits of a
people. Here, the rules rest on principles; which in turn reflect
cultural habits and values. These cultural habits all stem from the
character of the people and are thus consistent. Because legal prin-
ciples reflect these habits, the principles are consistent as well. Thus,
this part of law is characterized by a concealed internal structure.
A scientific approach can bring the principles and their structure
to light. But the totality of rules also contains many elements that
are only the result of arbitrary legislative decisions. Legal science
must discern and then discard those elements. They are not ex-
pressions of the people's culture but only of ad hoc legislative
choices. As a result, the proper function of legal science is to isolate
and put into ordered form the culturally grounded parts of a peo-
ple's law in order to preserve them as its true long-term tradition.' 79
It must keep this tradition free from disturbances by legislation
without lasting value.'" Thus, it can defend the harmony between
positive law and the character and culture of a people against ero-
sion through short-sighted rulemaking.
79 Savigny called it "das Wahre." Id. at XII (Vorrede).
' 8° Id. (das "Unachte").
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For Savigny, the criteria applied in this separation of the wheat
from the chaff were not at all purely intellectual, but quite practical.
In the "Volksgeistlehre" lies the belief that the organically grown
parts have so grown because they reflect practical needs. The people
and their common consciousness do not—as may a legislator—cre-
ate law out of a momentary desire, but only out of real practical
necessity. This is ensured by the collective and unconscious char-
acter of the organic process.' 8 ' Thus, respecting the organic insti-
tutions and rules virtually ensures the practical utility of law.' 82 All
this, of course, rests on an "invisible hand" view of the legal process,
according to which the law will work out best if left to itself.
Savigny's approach sounded plausible in an age in which ro-
mantic notions of national culture and organicism, the belief in the
evolution of ideas in history, and an "invisible hand" attitude to-
wards law .
 and the state were widely shared. But it was a theory
only, and in light of the practical chaos in law, the claim that the
Volksgeist held it all together looked doubtful. Savigny, however,
demonstrated in practice that the historical method could indeed
isolate leading principles and connect them in a systematic fashion.
The readers of his major works had to be impressed with the
thoroughness with which he treated the sources, the facility with
which he found the principles, and the elegance with which he
interconnected them. It seemed indeed as if his method could find
the order hidden in chaos.
But in fact, this success was possible only because Savigny and
his Romanist successors carefully limited their material to Roman
law. To be sure, Roman law had been the common law of Western
Europe since the middle ages. But it was not this medieval ius
commune that really mattered for Savigny. His classicist attitude led
him to focus on the classical Roman sources. In his admiration for
the ideas and methods of the jurists of ancient Rome, he considered
their work clearly superior to that of the medieval glossators.'"
Thus he wanted to purge legal doctrine of its medieval elements
and to return to the original text of Justinian's Corpus Iuris as well
as, after their discovery, to the Institutes of Gaius.
1 " In a sense almost reminiscent of modern psychology, Savigny thus trusted unconscious
human activity more than conscious decisions.
I " See SAVIGNY, SYSTEM I, supra note 61, at 14-16.
1 " The Roman jurists were practically minded, and Savigny admired that they always
worked on concrete problems. But his real interest was in the law as an intellectual enterprise
and in the evolution of legal concepts. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. Believing
that law was essentially custom cultivated by the jurists, he cared little for either Roman legal
practice, including courts and cases, or for Roman legislation.
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A closer look at the classical Roman law reveals that it was not
all that surprising to find coherent principles in the Digest and the
Institutes. The classical Roman jurists all worked in a highly similar
mode. They were a small, self-recruiting elite who shared the same
cultural background, social environment and intellectual interests.
They continuously debated legal issues and built on each other's
ideas. It could only be expected that their work would all express
the same intellectual spirit of their culture and that therefore, the
principles underlying their analyses would be culturally coherent.
Nor was it surprising that these principles could be put into a
logical order. A striving for logical consistency marked the reason-
ing of the classical Roman jurists themselves. They wasted little time
pursuing theories of substantive justice and instead worked on the
refinement of logical analysis and synthesis. In other words, the
very nature of Roman law favored a logical ordering of its concepts.
It allowed the extraction of abstract principles as building blocks
that could, if put together skillfully, form a coherent system.
Thus, the systematization of classical Roman law proved ac-
tually very little beyond the synthetic skills of Savigny and his suc-
cessors and beyond the sophistication of the Roman jurists them-
selves. It demonstrated only that Savigny's assumption of a cultural
coherence and logical order, of principles was true for a law that
stemmed from a highly homogeneous and elitist legal culture that
had itself already emphasized logical consistency. But the success of
the Romanists did not at all mean that a similar logical order could
also be found in other instances. Particularly where legal cultures
were more diverse, more popular, and less concerned with overall
consistency, the compatibility of "Geschichte" and "System" re-
mained unconfirmed.
C. The Character of "Rechtswissenschaft": Positivism, Idealism, and
Formalism
Nineteenth century German legal science followed Savigny in
all essential regards. It looked only to positive law. It was interested
mainly in its organic essence and considered only carefully selected
data. And finally, it was determined to find and to develop the
logical structure in law. This made "Rechtswissenschaft" a peculiar
mixture of positivism, idealism, and formalism.
Its positivism resulted from Savigny's original conception of
law as a cultural phenomenon. This positivism manifested itself in
several ways. It based legal science on (legal) data, namely the
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positive rules found in actual historical sources; as an expression of
culture; law, like language, needed to be observed and described,
but not created and prescribed.'" Thus, it excluded from legal
science metaphysical speculation as well as moral judgments. It
required that the law be accepted as historically given material
without changing its substance according to the rules of reason.
These postulates went hand in glove with the substantive, rather
than procedural, view of law to which "Rechtswissenschaft" sub-
scribed. Seeing law as custom predating the application of its rules
by officials," 5
 or as a logical system detected by the legal scientists, 186
meant that law was not the child of disputes but of their preexisting
substantive solution. It was applied to, not made in, conflict.
This sort of positivism pervading nineteenth century German
jurisprudence must be distinguished from two related forms.'87
First, it was radically different from the positivism accepting all law
simply because it was "posited." Such a "legislative positivism" rec-
ognizes as law the commands of the proper lawgiver. In contrast,
German legal science denied recognition on this ground and indeed
considered much of the legislatively made law arbitrary and there-
fore scientifically irrelevant. Savigny and his successors accepted
only the scientific law. This "scientific legal positivism" recognized
law not because of its origin in official authority but because of its
basis in leading principles and its logical consistency.
Second, it differed from the scientific positivism of Comte and
his disciples. They wanted to reduce science to the observation of
physical, social or psychological facts. In contrast, German "scientific
legal positivism" analyzed intellectual constructs—legal rules and
principles. These constructs were not facts in the Comtean sense
but data of intellectual evolution. Scientific positivism sought order
in the external world, but German legal science believed in an order
in the evolution of legal ideas.
As a result, German legal science was not only positivist but
also idealist in a peculiar sense. This idealism was the result of
Savigny's notion of "Geschichte," particularly of its "organicist ele-
ment." Only the assumption of an organic wholeness inherent in
the apparently chaotic positive law had made the connection be-
tween history and system possible. Therefore, the search for this
184 See supra note 62-68 and accompanying text.
185 SAVIGNY, SYSTEM 1, supra note 61, at 14-15.
166 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
"'The following distinctions build on F. WIEACKER, supra note 20, at 431-32.
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organic wholeness became the lodestar of "Rechtswissenschaft."
German legal science was not interested in the historical data as
such, but in the higher truth contained in them. The individual
rules were contingent on time and space, but they were only man-
ifestations of generally valid principles because in their endless
variety there was always the unity of the Volksgeist. Positive data
were the external form of ultimate ideas. In this idealization of
reality, Savigny stood in the tradition of Schelling, Herder, and
Hegel and their belief that history as a process unfolds ideas and
unveils the absolute.' 88
This idealism pervaded German legal thought throughout the
century. The belief that "Wirklichkeit" (reality) expresses "Wahr-
heit" (truth) took on a variety of forms. For Savigny, the historical
sources contained the cultural truth of the Volksgeist. For Puchta,
positive law was marked by the logical truth of the concepts and
their system. For Jhering, the leading concepts demonstrated a
quasi-biological organic truth of the law. For the Germanists, the
essence of the medieval sources was the ideal of popular liberty and
lay justice. They all looked to positive data, but only because they
saw them as expressions of absolute ideas.
But despite its underlying idealism, this positivism was also
formalist in its practical execution. This formalism was twofold.
Legal science had a formal concept of law as its basis, and it em-
ployed formal logic as its method.
The formal concept of law underlying "Rechtswissenschaft"
stemmed from Kant and was endorsed by Savigny. In his attempt
to overcome the muddle of natural law theory, Kant had separated
law from morals and had limited it strictly to the regulation of
external acts. Thus, Kant had defined law as the conditions under
which the freedom of one individual can coexist with the freedom
of other individuals.'" Adopting this view, Savigny saw the law as
"the limit" determining the boundaries of individual spheres of
freedom.' 9° The function of law was the protection of one individ-
ual's freedom against another's, not the implementation of any sort
of substantive morality or policy. Law was therefore not concerned
with notions of substantive justice or with the implementation of
social goals. It did not consider equality of bargaining power or
' 83 See J. RUCKERT, IDEALISMUS, JURISPRUDENZ UND POLITIK BEI FRIEDRICH KARL VON
SAVIGNY 232-36,240-41,406-14 (1984).
leg I. KANT, supra note 27, at 230-31.
ig° SAVIGNY, SYSTEM I, supra note 61, at 331 ("die Granze").
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group interests. It was only a formal and abstract determination of
the boundaries "inside of which the existence and activity of the
individual enjoys a secure and free space." 191
With this credo of liberalism, Savigny and his successors reacted
against the paternalism of the princes during the preceding cen-
turies. 192 Casting the morality of natural law into legislative form,
the absolutist monarchs had tried to employ law for the enforce-
ment of ethical standards, economic programs, and political goals.'"
When German jurists now postulated that "ethical, political [and]
economic considerations" were "not a concern of the lawyer as
such,"'" this did not necessarily prove their blindness to the im-
portance of these factors for social life. It was also an expression of
their liberalism according to which ethical, economic, and political
decisions should be left to the individual instead of being prescribed
by the law. Of course, this liberalism reflected the interests of the
increasingly powerful bourgeoisie. If law should not infringe upon
individual freedom more than necessary for mutual protection,
individuals must .be free to contract and to use their property as
long as the identical freedom of others was not legally infringed.
Thus, the formalist concept of law yielded support for economic
laissez-faire.
Savigny must, however, not be mistaken for a political liberal.
In contrast to Kant, he was concerned only with the protection of
private activity against state interference, not with the guaranty of
political rights against public authority. The freedom he had in
mind was the freedom of the bourgeois, not that of the citoyen. It was
the Germanists who fought for the latter, and they found themselves
in political opposition to Savigny.
Savigny's formal concept of law was also highly individualist
because it considered law a question of personal liberty to act, not
an issue of the relationships within social structures. This stood in
marked contrast to collectivist elements in Savigny's historical theory
of law. While the origin of positive law lay in collective conscious-
ness, its function was the protection of individual freedom. From
191 Id. at 331-32 ("innerhalb welcher das Daseyn, and die Wirksamkeit jedes Einzeln
cinen sichern, freyen Raum gewinne").
192
 This paternalism had manifested itself particularly in the highly detailed rules of the
Allgemeine Landrecht fur die Preussischen Staaten (Prussian General Land Law) of 1794.
193 For a study of the paternalism of the earlier Police-Ordinances (Polizey-Ordnungen),
see K. MAIER, DIE ANFANGE DER POLIZEI-UND LANDESGESETZGEBUNG IN DER MARKGRAFSCHAFT
BADEN (1984).
191 B. WINDSCHEID, GESAMMELTE REDEN UND ABHANDLUNGEN 112 (1903).
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this perspective, the emphasis of legal science on private law was
only logical. Public regulation threatened to impose limits on indi-
vidual freedom in the interest of the collective.' 95 That was perhaps
inevitable in many instances, but it was not the true purpose of law
and surely not the true concern of legal science.
Savigny put this abstract and formalist concept of law into
practical effect when he made the approach of the classical Roman
jurists the model for nineteenth century German jurisprudence.
From Labeo to Papinian, they had focused on the abstract, formal
rationality of the rules that had constituted the private and individ-
ualist law of the owning class in ancient Rome. Savigny never really
explained why the Volksgeist of the Roman culture applied to his
own times, But such an explanation was as theoretically difficult as
it was practically superfluous. It seemed obvious at least to the
German Romanists that their era needed a law that was private,
individualist, and formal. Like the Roman law, it had to provide a
sophisticated scheme for the coordination of increasingly complex
private affairs, without getting , involved in the political battles of its
time. In that sense, the spirit of classical Roman law was indeed
highly congenial to the needs of the nineteenth century German
bourgeoisie.
As a method, the formalism of German legal science had its
roots in Savigny's notion of "System." From existing principles and
rules within the system, he had argued, new ones could be deduced
in quasi-mathematical fashion.' 9" In this regard, he was not reacting
against, but rather continuing the natural law tradition. When con-
ceptual jurisprudence and Pandektenwissenschaft pushed the sys-
tematic approach further and saw legal reasoning predominantly
as logical operation, legal science presented formalism in an ex-
treme form, expressly excluding from legal method everything but
logical and systematic conclusions.' 97
Thus, nineteenth century German legal science was positivist
in its focus on historical sources and in its renunciation of the search
for normative standards. It was idealist in its belief that the histor-
ically contingent rules contained timeless principles and in its as-
sumption that in reality there is reason. And it was formalist in its
1 " Already Savigny complained about the trend "to govern everything, and to want to
govern ever more" Canes zu regieren, und immer mehr regieren zu wollen"). Siimmen
und wider neue Gesetzbaeher, 3 ZErrscruuvr FOR GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 1
(1816), reprinted in H. HATTENHAUEH, THIBAUT UNE, SAVIGNY, supra note 61, at 250 (1973).
L96 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
894	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	 [Vol. 31:837
definition of law that excluded substantive considerations and in its
adherence to deductive logic.
"Rechtswissenschaft" was therefore a concept full of tensions.
But its fusion of the real and the ideal, the historical and the logical,
the organic and the systematic, promised to resolve conflicts hitherto
believed unresolvable. Historical change and eternal truth were
reconciled because the former only expressed the latter in successive
stages. Contemporaneous diversity and all-encompassing unity went
hand in hand because the one was only the multitude of variations
on the other. Organic growth and systematic perfection coexisted
because evolution developed the seed of timeless logic. And collec-
tive consciousness and individual freedom were harmonized be-
cause the law stemmed from the Volksgeist but protected the liberty
of the individual.
As a result of its amalgamation of positivist, idealist, and for-
malist elements, "Rechtswissenschaft" could even reconcile legal the-
ory and practice under the banner of legal science in peaceful
cooperation.'" Jurisprudence remained linked to practice because
it took the ultimate ideas from positive law and then gave them
back to it as a formally logical system. Legal practice, in turn, was
linked to jurisprudence because it derived the positive rules it ap-
plied to concrete cases from the system of principles through formal
logic. Thus, "Rechtswissenschaft" provided for a functiorial diver-
sification among the legal actors and at the same time ensured an
underlying jurisprudential theory common to all.
IV. THE PERCEPTION OF LEGAL SCIENCE: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
PERSPECTIVE
From an Anglo-American perspective, both the variety of its
external branches and the methodological promises implicit in its
underlying ideas made German legal science an intriguing phenom-
enon. Its diversity of scholarship allowed common law jurists to
identify it with many different things. And its fundamental concepts
deeply appealed to their innermost beliefs.
The diversity of its branches explains the bewildering variety
of perceptions of German jurisprudence by Anglo-American schol-
ars that we encountered in the introduction.' 99
 They talked about
ise SAVIGNY, BERUF supra note 61, at 171-74; SAVIGNY, SYSTEM I, supra note 61, at XIX-
XXVIII.
I99 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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the "historical school" (or about German legal science in general)
as if this phenomenon were monolithic, and as if everybody knew
and agreed on what it was. At the same time, each of these scholars
really had only one or another of the many different aspects of
German legal science in mind. In other words, Anglo-American
jurists shared the terminology but not always its meaning.
Often they referred to the historical school only in a narrower
sense, i.e., to Savigny's original program of 1814-1815 and its im-
mediate predecessors and followers."° The characterizations still
differed, but there was at least an implicit agreement about the
subject matter. Even this original program was, of course, so am-
biguous that both scholars of medieval history and analytical jurists
could see Savigny as a model—as a profound historian or as a great
dogmatic and systematic thinker. 2°'
In other instances, Anglo-American scholars thought of the
historical school in a wider sense altogether, i.e., including the later
developments that Savigny's program had triggered. Here, some-
times flatly contradictory views were maintained. Roscoe Pound saw
in the historical school a pernicious "jurisprudence of concepts" 2°2
but also praised it as a "force for unity, for system, for a reasoned
body of principles" 203
 while James Bryce lauded the historical school
as giving "the best crop" of all forms of jurisprudence because "it
may at least be relied on to give us facts." 2" Similarly, Munroe
Smith could chastize German legal science for its abstractness and
generality, while Holmes praised its love for detail. 203
All of these perceptions were incomplete, but none of them
was therefore incorrect. In fact, they were all reconcilable given
that their authors had different aspects of German legal science in
mind—the broad conceptualism of Puchta and jhering or the me-
ticulous research of Brunner and Heusler, the systematic treatises
of Vangerow and Windscheid or the editions of original sources by
Mommsen and Amira. 206
2°°
	 is true for most of the works on the historical school cited supra note 12.
2°' See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
2°' Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLum. L, REV. 605, 613 (1908).
2°S Pound, Taught Law, 37 A.B.A. REP. 975, 996 (1912).
21)4
 J. BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 624 (1901).
2°S See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
2 °6
 In large part as a result of the German influence, the late 19th century American
"historical school" was similarly diverse. It has therefore meant different things to different
scholars. When Pound complained about "its exclusive reign in American juristic thought in
the past fifty years," he was critical of its emphasis on a priori principles and of its hostility
towards legislation. R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 155-56 (1921). Thomas C.
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The diversity of its branches thus made German legal science
a useful, but also a dangerous, resource for arguments. Common
law jurists could see in German jurisprudence a variety of qualities,
good or bad, depending on one's perspective, and thus derive from
it arguments in support of sometimes opposite agendas. The down-
side, however, was that without clarification these different mean-
ings also became a source of terminological confusion and thus
miscommunication.
But German jurisprudence was intriguing not only because its
diversity provided a rich arsenal of weapons in jurisprudential bat-
tles, but also because the German idea of legal science itself, with
its notions of history, system, and, above all, their combination, was
deeply attractive to many Anglo-American scholars. It is unlikely
that they fully understood the concept of "Rechtswissenschaft" in
its complex interplay of ideas, but that was not necessary to feel its
appeal more or less consciously.
Its aspect of "Geschichte" was fascinating in all its three ele-
ments. The historicist element resonated with the common lawyers'
sense of tradition and search for guidance in the past. In fact,
Savigny was probably closer to their hearts than to those of many
nineteenth century German jurists. Its organicism and emphasis on
growth of legal ideas rang true to many late nineteenth century
believers in evolution. Of course, with his emphasis on peaceful and
silent development, Savigny was no Darwinist at all, but the writings
particularly of later German jurists could be read to suggest that
law and biology were closely related. And finally the emphasis of
"Geschichte" on the exploration of (historical) facts sounded right
to those who subscribed to the new positivist concept of science.
Again, Savigny's notion of data was far from identical with that of
late nineteenth century positivists, but to discern the difference
required greater familiarity with his work than most Anglo-Amer-
ican jurists ever had or desired.
Also, the notion of a "System" was seductive in many ways. The
idea of a logical arrangement of law attracted many late nineteenth
century Anglo-American lawyers who were tired of the common
-law's lack of systematic coherence. They were frightened by the
Grey, in contrast, identified it mostly with James Coolidge Carter and the view of law as
custom, Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 30 (1983), while Robert Gordon
used the term to describe the "institutional-evolutionary studies in legal history" of Holmes,
Bigelow, Thayer and Ames at Harvard in the 1880s and 1890s. R. W. Gordon, J. Willard
Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW AND SOC. REV.
9, 15 (1975).
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increasing chaos of case law, which had become glaringly apparent
after the abolition of the forms of action. The idea that such a
system could be complete was captivating to those who longed for
a closed legal order that could handle all social issues with mechan-
ical ease. Not many Anglo-American jurists before Holmes and
Pound recognized it as a grand illusion. And the notion of an
organic, self-reproductive system appealed to the believers in the
autonomy of the common law who wanted to see it in the hands of
the lawyers and not of the democratically elected legislatures. Such
a system could be developed from within so that lawmaking from
without was an unnecessary disturbance. 207
Last, but not least, the prospect of a grand reconciliation of the
actual historical record, reflecting the spirit and needs of the people,
with a systematic order for the learned jurists was attractive to
everyone who could make himself believe in it. It promised to
overcome the old dichotomy of logic and experience by making the
life of the law both at the same time.208
907 An important representative of this group was Savigny's American disciple James
Coolidge Carter. See Reimann, The Historical School Against Codification, supra note 5, at 114—
18.
505 There were, of course, other factors that attracted Anglo-American scholars to 19th
century German "legal science," but they must be left for separate studies. Prominent among
these factors were the institutional implications of "Rechtswissenschaft," i.e. the connections
between the jurisprudential concept and the status of legal academics, the quality of legal
education, and the university system as a whole.
It is arguable that German legal science never really fulfilled its grand promise of
reconciling history with logic, even in the codification that it generated. This question is not
my concern here. It should be pointed out, though, that American legal scholarship turned
away from, and often outright against, German jurisprudence around the time of World
War I when the elite of American scholars began to abandon classical legal science in favor
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